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THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING 
OUTSIDE THE “HOT” CONFLICT ZONE 
JENNIFER C. DASKAL† 
The U.S. conflict with al Qaeda raises a number of complicated and contested 
questions regarding the geographic scope of the battlefield and the related limits on the 
state’s authority to use lethal force and to detain without charge. To date, the legal 
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and policy discussions on this issue have resulted in a heated and intractable debate. 
On the one hand, the United States and its supporters argue that the conflict—and 
broad detention and targeting authorities—extend to wherever the alleged enemy is 
found, subject to a series of malleable policy constraints. On the other hand, European 
allies, human rights groups, and other scholars, fearing the creep of war, counter that 
the conflict and related authorities are geographically limited to Afghanistan and 
possibly northwest Pakistan. Based on this view, state action outside these areas is 
governed exclusively by civilian law enforcement, tempered by international human 
rights norms. 
This Article breaks through the impasse. It offers a new and comprehensive law-
of-war framework that mediates the multifaceted security, liberty, and foreign policy 
interests at stake. Specifically, the Article recognizes the state’s need to respond to the 
enemy threat wherever it is located, but argues that the rules for doing so ought to 
distinguish between the so-called “hot battlefield” and elsewhere. It proposes a set of 
binding standards that would limit and legitimize the use of targeted killings and 
law-of-war detention outside zones of active hostilities—subjecting their use to an 
individualized threat assessment, a least-harmful-means test, and significant 
procedural safeguards. The Article concludes by describing how and why this 
approach should be incorporated into U.S. and international law and applied to what 
are likely to be increasingly common threats posed by transnational non–state actors 
in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 19, 2011, U.S. military forces captured Ahmed Abdulkadir 
Warsame in the Arabian Gulf region and placed him aboard a naval ship.1 
He was interrogated for approximately two months before being transferred 
to New York and charged in federal civilian court.2 The Obama Admin-
istration claimed that he initially was captured and detained pursuant to the 
laws of war, and that the decision to transfer him to civilian court was a 
policy choice based on the nation’s security interests.3 The decision led to 
 
1 See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Accused Al Shabaab Leader 
Charged with Providing Material Support to Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(July 5, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July11/warsameindictment 
pr.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, et al., to Mike 
Johanns, U.S. Sen. (July 25, 2011) (on file with author) (“The decision to prosecute Warsame in 
federal court, made only after conducting a comprehensive intelligence interrogation to the 
satisfaction of the Intelligence Community and only after careful consideration of all the available 
options, is in the best interests of national security.”); see also Sarah Parnass, Keeping a Suspected 
Terrorist On a Boat for Two Months and the ATF Chief Testifies: Today’s Qs for O’s WH—7/6/2011, 
Posted to Political Punch, ABC NEWS (July 6, 2011, 11:37 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2011/07/keeping-a-suspected-terrorist-on-a-boat-for-two-months-and-the-atf-chief-testifies-
todays-qs-for-os-1/ (citing the law of war as the legal basis for Warsame’s detention) (quoting Interview 
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an immediate outcry from both ends of the political spectrum. Several 
leaders of Congress and high-profile commentators argued that Warsame 
should have been moved to Guantanamo Bay or another site for long-term 
law-of-war detention rather than being transferred to the civilian court 
system for trial.4 Others decried the reliance on the laws of war for even the 
short-term detention and interrogation of someone picked up far from any 
conventional battlefield.5 
Six months later, the United States reportedly launched a drone into 
Yemen, killing Anwar al Aulaqi, the alleged operational leader of al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula, an ostensible co-belligerent of al Qaeda.6 Once 
again, a vocal and polarized debate ensued, with critics of the alleged killing 
deploring the Obama Administration’s use of law-of-war tactics outside the 
so-called “hot battlefield” of Afghanistan.7  
 
by Jake Tapper, Senior White House Correspondent, ABC News, with Jay Carney, White House 
Press Sec’y (July 6, 2011)).  
4 See, e.g., Ten Years After the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Current Status of 
Legal Authorities, Detention, and Prosecution in the War on Terror: Hearing Before the H. Comm. Armed 
Servs., 112th Cong. 4-6 (2011) (statement of Michael B. Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen. of the U.S.) 
(“Based on my own experience as a trial judge and as Attorney General, I have concluded that 
Article III courts are not ideally suited for trying many or most of [the detainee] cases.”); 157 
CONG. REC. S4334 (July 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) (“Mr. Warsame is a 
foreign enemy combatant, and he should be treated as one. He should be sitting in a cell in 
Guantanamo Bay and eventually tried before a military commission.”); Joseph I. Lieberman & 
Kelly Ayotte, Why We Still Need Guantanamo, WASH. POST, July 22, 2011, at A17 (“Given the 
activities that Warsame is suspected of having engaged in[,] . . . the logical place for the Obama 
administration to have sent him was Guantanamo Bay . . . .”); Letter from Five Comm. Chairs, 
U.S. H. Rep., to President Barack Obama (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Letter-to-President-Obama-July-19-2011.pdf (seeking an “explana-
tion as to why detention [of Warsame and other terrorists] at Guantanamo Bay is considered ‘off 
the table’”); Letter from Twenty-Three U.S. Senators to Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def. (July 12, 
2011), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM170_detaineesletter.html (expressing 
concern that the use of civilian trials for enemy combatants “appears to be a circumvention of the 
clear intent of many in Congress that terrorists captured abroad . . . should not be brought into 
U.S. for trial”). 
5 See, e.g., Editorial, Terrorism and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at SR11; see also Noah 
Feldman, U.S. Legal Dilemma Exposed by Somali Terror Case, BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-11/u-s-legal-dilemma-exposed-by-somali-terror-case-noah-
feldman.html (“We are at war with al-Qaeda, which Congress has said includes all those who 
perpetrated or supported the September 11 attacks. We are not, however, at war with all terrorists 
everywhere—including the Somali rebel group Al Shabab. Membership in Al Shabab is therefore 
not grounds for POW-style detention.”). 
6 See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born 
Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1 (detailing the pursuit and killing of al 
Aulaqi). 
7 While much of the commentary also focused on the fact that al Aulaqi was a U.S. citizen, 
the debate was largely triggered by the fact that he was targeted outside a conventional battlefield. 
See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Obama Team’s Al-Awlaki Memo Furthered Bush Legacy, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
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The Warsame and al Aulaqi cases highlight longstanding—and still 
unresolved—questions about the international law rules governing the use of 
force and detention outside areas resembling a traditional armed conflict with 
boot on the ground. While there is general agreement that the United States 
has had the authority to target and detain enemy fighters within Afghani-
stan since late 2001, and in Iraq from 2003 to 2011, the notion that the 
United States can take custody of, and perhaps kill, any alleged member of 
al Qaeda or associated forces wherever he or she is found—including within 
the United States—continues to make many uneasy.8 
The debate has largely devolved into an either–or dichotomy, even 
while security and practical considerations demand more nuanced practices. 
Thus, the United States, supported by a vocal group of scholars, including 
Professors Jack Goldsmith, Curtis Bradley, and Robert Chesney, has long 
asserted that it is at war with al Qaeda and associated groups. Therefore, it 
can legitimately detain without charge—and kill—al Qaeda members and 
their associates wherever they are found, subject of course to additional law-
of-war, constitutional, and sovereignty constraints.9 Conversely, European 
 
16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-17/obama-team-s-al-awlaki-memo-furthered-bush-
legacy-noah-feldman.html (emphasizing that al Aulaqi was not “on a battlefield, except according 
to the view that anywhere in the world can be the battlefield in the war on terrorism”). Had al 
Aulaqi been killed while fighting on the front lines in Afghanistan, the killing likely would have 
been deemed by most observers as legitimate. In World War II, for example, the United States 
attacked Axis military units containing U.S. citizen personnel with little public response. Cf. In re 
Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (rejecting a claim by an American-born individual 
captured by American forces while he was serving in the Italian military that he could not be 
“legally a prisoner of war” due to his citizenship status).  
8 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 12-1192 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012), 2012 WL 
3024212 [hereinafter Al Aulaqi Complaint] (warning of the risks associated with killings that “have 
taken place outside the context of armed conflict, in countries including Yemen, Somalia, 
Pakistan, Sudan, and the Philippines”); Letter from Rand Paul, U.S. Sen., to John Brennan, Ass’t 
to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism (Feb. 20, 2013), available at http://www. 
paul.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=713 (expressing concern about the possibility of a drone 
strike on a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil). 
9 See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, 
Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law & Security: Strengthening our Security by 
Adhering to our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Brennan, Harvard Law School 
Remarks], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an (“The United States does not view our authority 
to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghani-
stan.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2117-23 (2005) (arguing that neither the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (AUMF) nor international law limit the geographic scope of the use of force 
against enemies of the state, whether outside or within the United States); Robert Chesney, Who 
May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 857-58 (2011) 
(describing membership in an AUMF-covered group as a sufficient condition for detention, 
although also indicating that it might, as a matter of policy, be appropriate to limit membership-
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allies, supported by an equally vocal group of scholars and human rights 
advocates, assert that the United States is engaged in a conflict with al 
Qaeda only in specified regions, and that the United States’ authority to 
employ law-of-war detention and lethal force extends only to those particular 
zones.10 In all other places, al Qaeda and its associates should be subject to 
 
based detention to those captured outside the United States); see also Michael W. Lewis, Drones 
and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 312-13 (2012) (“By limiting [interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL)] to territory on which the threshold of violence for an armed 
conflict is currently occurring, IHL would effectively create sanctuaries for terrorist organizations 
in any state not currently involved in a domestic insurgency in which law enforcement is known to 
be ineffective.”); Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2013) (rejecting 
efforts to place strict geography-based limits on the application of international humanitarian law). 
10 See, e.g., Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9 (noting that “[o]thers in the 
international community—including some of our closest allies and partners—take a different view 
of the geographic scope of the conflict, limiting it only to the ‘hot’ battlefields”); see also Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Abitrary Executions, Study on Targeted 
Killings, Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 53-56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by 
Philip Alston) (expressing skepticism that the United States is in armed conflict with al Qaeda 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law 
and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, at 10, 31IC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011) (“[T]he [Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross] does not share the view that a conflict of global dimensions is 
or has been taking place [between al Qaeda and the United States].”); Declaration of Prof. Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, para. 14, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-01469) 
[hereinafter O’Connell Declaration] (“That the United States is engaged in armed conflict against 
al Qaeda in Afghanistan does not mean that [it] can rely on the law of armed conflict to engage 
suspected associates of al Qaeda in other countries. . . . Armed conflict exists in the territorially 
limited zone of intense armed fighting by organized armed groups.” (emphasis added)); Al Aulaqi 
Complaint, supra note 8; Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework 
Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 245, 266 (2010) (“It is 
hard to see how one can . . . hold that the mere fact that some members of the armed forces of 
[a] non-state party are present on the territory of a third state could trigger the geographical 
extension of the armed conflict to the territory of that State as well.”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
Essay, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 858 (2009) (“In addition to 
exchange, intensity, and duration
 
[of fighting], armed conflicts have a spatial dimension. It is not 
the case that if there is an armed conflict in one state—for example, Afghanistan—that all the 
world is at war, or even that Afghanis and Americans are at war with each other all over the 
planet.”); Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guan-
tanamo, The Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military 
Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1342, 1347 (2007) (arguing that “any conflict 
between the United States and al Qaeda as such cannot amount to war or trigger the application of 
the laws of war,” and that, as a result, application of the laws of war should be geographically 
limited to the areas where the United States is engaged in separate conflicts with other belligerent 
groups or operates as an occupying power, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq); Gabor Rona, 
Interesting Times for International Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2003, at 55, 62 (questioning whether the “targeted killings of 
terrorist suspects by U.S. authorities in Yemen” in the year following September 11, 2001 should 
be considered part of an armed conflict). 
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law enforcement measures, as governed by international human rights law 
and the domestic laws of the relevant states.11 
Recent statements by United States officials suggest an attempt to 
mediate between these two extremes, at least for purposes of targeted 
killing, and as a matter of policy, not law. While continuing to assert a global 
conflict with al Qaeda, official statements have limited the defense of out-
of-conflict zone targeting operations to high-level leaders and others who 
pose a “significant” threat.12 In the words of President Obama’s then-
Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, John O. Brennan, 
the United States does not seek to “eliminate every single member of al-
Qaida in the world,” but instead conducts targeted strikes to mitigate 
“actual[,] ongoing threat[s].”13 That said, the United States continues to 
suggest that it can, as a matter of law, “take action” against anyone who is 
“part of ” al Qaeda or associated forces—a very broad category of persons—
without any explicit geographic limits.14 
The stakes are high. If the United States were permitted to launch a 
drone strike against an alleged al Qaeda operative in Yemen, why not in 
London—so long as the United States had the United Kingdom’s consent 
and was confident that collateral damage to nearby civilians would be 
minimal (thereby addressing sovereignty and proportionality concerns)? 
There are many reasons why such a scenario is unlikely, but the United 
 
11 See, e.g., Al Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 8, at 3-4; Rona, supra note 10, at 64.  
12 See Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9, (emphasizing that the “Admin-
istration’s counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals 
who are a threat to the United States, whose removal would cause a significant—even if only 
temporary—disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces”); 
Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against Osama bin Laden, OPINIO JURIS 
(May 19, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-
against-osama-bin-laden (defending the targeting of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden due to his 
“unquestioned leadership position” and “clear continuing operational role”). 
13  John O. Brennan, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, 
Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy of the 
President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Brennan, Wilson Center 
Remarks], available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-
strategy. 
14 Id. (emphasizing that “individuals who are part of al-Qaida or its associated forces are 
legitimate military targets”); see also Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html (highlighting that the authority to 
“take action against enemy belligerents” is “not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan”); Jeh 
Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech at the Oxford Union: The Conflict 
Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will it End? (Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Oxford Remarks], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-
union (describing the United States as “taking the fight directly to [al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula]” in Yemen). 
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States has yet to assert any limiting principle that would, as a matter of law, 
prohibit such actions. And in fact, the United States did rely on the laws of 
war to detain a U.S. citizen picked up in a Chicago airport for almost four 
years.15 
Even if one accepts the idea that the United States now exercises its 
asserted authority with appropriate restraint, what is to prevent Russia, for 
example, from asserting that it is engaged in an armed conflict with Chechens 
and that it can target or detain, without charge, an alleged member of a 
Chechen rebel group wherever he or she is found, including possibly in the 
United States?  
Conversely, it cannot be the case—as the extreme version of the terri-
torially restricted view of the conflict suggests—that an enemy with whom 
a state is at war can merely cross a territorial boundary in order to plan or 
plot, free from the threat of being captured or killed. In the London example, 
law enforcement can and should respond effectively to the threat.16 But 
there also will be instances in which the enemy escapes to an effective safe 
haven because the host state is unable or unwilling to respond to the threat 
(think Yemen and Somalia in the current conflict), capture operations are 
infeasible because of conditions on the ground (think parts of Yemen and 
Somalia again), or criminal prosecution is not possible, at least in the short 
run.  
This Article proposes a way forward—offering a new legal framework 
for thinking about the geography of the conflict in a way that better medi-
ates the multifaceted liberty, security, and foreign policy interests at stake. 
It argues that the jus ad bellum questions about the geographic borders of the 
conflict that have dominated much of the literature are the wrong questions 
to focus on. Rather, it focuses on jus in bello questions about the conduct of 
hostilities. This Article assumes that the conflict extends to wherever the 
enemy threat is found, but argues for more stringent rules of conduct 
outside zones of active hostilities. Specifically, it proposes a series of 
substantive and procedural rules designed to limit the use of lethal targeting 
 
15 See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution allowed the President to militarily detain a U.S. citizen 
taken into custody in the United States). On June 9, 2002, President Bush ordered that Padilla, 
who had been arrested by civilian law enforcement officials in Chicago, be transferred to military 
custody and detained as an “enemy combatant.” Id. at 389-90. On January 3, 2006, Padilla was 
transferred back to federal court, where he was charged and convicted of providing material 
support to terrorists and two conspiracy charges. Although President Bush initially claimed 
Padilla had been planning to build and explode a dirty bomb in the United States, he was never 
charged with such a crime. See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Hassoun, 477 F. Supp. 
2d 1210 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (No. 04-60001), 2005 WL 5680800.  
16 The same is true, of course, in the United States.  
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and detention outside zones of active hostilities—subjecting their use to an 
individualized threat finding, a least-harmful-means test, and meaningful 
procedural safeguards.17 
The Article does not claim that existing law, which is uncertain and 
contested, dictates this approach. (Nor does it preclude this approach.) 
Rather, the Article explicitly recognizes that the set of current rules, 
developed mostly in response to state-on-state conflicts in a world without 
drones, fails to address adequately the complicated security and liberty 
issues presented by conflicts between a state and mobile non–state actors in 
a world where technological advances allow the state to track and attack the 
enemy wherever he is found. New rules are needed. Drawing on evolving 
state practice, underlying principles of the law of war, and prudential policy 
considerations, the Article proposes a set of such rules for conflicts between 
states and transnational non–state actors—rules designed both to promote 
the state’s security and legitimacy and to protect against the erosion of 
individual liberty and the rule of law.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how the legal 
framework under which the United States is currently operating has 
generated legitimate concerns about the creep of war. This Part outlines 
how the U.S. approach over the past several years has led to a polarized 
debate between opposing visions of a territorially broad and territorially 
restricted conflict, and how both sides of the debate have failed to 
 
17 This Article assumes that the United States has been engaged in an ongoing armed conflict 
with al Qaeda and associated forces and is therefore primarily focused on the rules regarding the use 
of force and detention within an armed conflict. The United States has also hinted at a separate and 
independent self-defense justification for the use of force—an issue that will become increasingly 
important as the armed conflict with al Qaeda winds down. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A 
SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/ 
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (describing the authority “to respond to the imminent threat posed 
by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces” as arising from the existence of an armed conflict, the 
AUMF, and “the inherent right of the United States to national self-defense under international 
law”); Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (“As a matter of international law, the 
United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces, in response 
to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with our inherent right of national self-
defense.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law 
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (“[T]he United 
States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in 
response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-
defense under international law.”). It is unclear whether the United States has yet relied on a self-
defense claim—and in what circumstances it would in the future—as a separate authority to use force 
outside the context of an armed conflict. I take up this issue briefly in Part IV. 
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acknowledge the legitimate substantive concerns of the other. Part II 
explains why a territorially broad conflict can and should distinguish 
between zones of active hostilities and elsewhere, thus laying out the broad 
framework under which the Article’s proposal rests. 
Part III details the proposed zone approach. It distinguishes zones of 
active hostilities from both peacetime and lawless zones, and outlines the 
enhanced substantive and procedural standards that ought to apply in the 
latter two zones. Specifically, Part III argues that outside zones of active 
hostilities, law-of-war detention and use of force should be employed only 
in exceptional situations, subject to an individualized threat finding, least-
harmful-means test, and meaningful procedural safeguards.18 This Part also 
describes how such an approach maps onto the conflict with al Qaeda, and 
is, at least in several key ways, consistent with the approach already taken 
by the United States as a matter of policy.  
Finally, Part IV explains how such an approach ought to apply not just 
to the current conflict with al Qaeda but to other conflicts with transnational 
non–state actors in the future, as well as self-defense actions that take place 
outside the scope of armed conflict. It concludes by making several recom-
mendations as to how this approach should be incorporated into U.S. and, 
ultimately, international law. 
The Article is United States–focused, and is so for a reason. To be sure, 
other states, most notably Israel, have engaged in armed conflicts with non–
state actors that are dispersed across several states or territories.19 But the 
United States is the first state to self-consciously declare itself at war with a 
non–state terrorist organization that potentially spans the globe. Its actions 
and asserted authorities in response to this threat establish a reference point 
for state practice that will likely be mimicked by others and inform the 
development of customary international law. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE TERRITORIAL DIVIDE: 
THE UNITED STATES VERSUS AL QAEDA 
It is commonly accepted that once a state is engaged in an armed conflict, 
peacetime rules no longer apply. Killings that would be deemed murder or 
 
18 I adopt the definition of “targeted killing” offered by Nils Melzer: “[T]he term ‘targeted 
killing’ denotes the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, 
premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical 
custody of those targeting them.” NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5 (2008). 
19 For a discussion of post–World War II noninternational armed conflicts that have 
involved fighting in multiple states, see id. at 259-61. 
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assassination outside armed conflict are not only permitted, but overtly 
pursued. Moreover, preventive detention schemes that bear little resem-
blance to Western democracies’ criminal justice systems are both allowed 
and often deemed necessary for the duration of the conflict.  
Such a system works well when the enemy force is easily identifiable 
and distinguishable, and the conflict is both geographically and temporally 
limited. In the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda, however, 
none of these prerequisites apply. The enemy hides among the civilian 
population and is scattered across the globe.20 There is no obvious endpoint, 
as it is unlikely that the United States is ever going to declare a truce or 
establish diplomatic relations with a terrorist enemy such as al Qaeda.21 
(Moreover, even after the “war” is deemed to have come to an end, the 
United States has increasingly laid the groundwork for an expansive view of 
self-defense—an issue to which I return in Part IV.) And due to technological 
advances, namely the use of drones, the United States has the ability to 
track and target the alleged enemy just about anywhere he is found. 
The conflict has exposed the gaps in the legal framework governing the 
conduct of armed conflict. Neither the laws of international armed 
conflict—governing conflicts that arise when one state is fighting another 
state—nor the laws of noninternational armed conflict—governing conflicts 
that have historically been deemed to take place within a single state’s 
territory—provide an appropriate framework for dealing with a conflict 
involving a non–state actor with global reach. Critically, they do not answer 
fundamental questions regarding the scope of the conflict, and the belligerent 
state’s corresponding authority (or lack thereof) to bypass ordinary law 
 
20 For an interactive map of al Qaeda’s global presence, see Alan McLean & Arche Tse, Map 
of Countries Where al Qaeda and Its Affiliates Operate, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/12/world/12aqmap.html?_r=0. 
21 That said, recent statements by Jeh Johnson, then-General Counsel for the U.S. 
Department of Defense, describes a future “tipping point at which so many of the leaders and 
operatives of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured” that the organization is 
“effectively destroyed” and the armed conflict will end. Johnson, Oxford Remarks, supra note 14. 
See also Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (predicting al Qaeda’s future “demise” as 
a result of U.S. actions); Peter Bergen, And Now, Only One Senior Al Qaeda Leader Left, 
CNN.COM (June 6, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/05/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-whos-left/index. 
html (describing al Qaeda as “more or less out of business”). This issue as to when the conflict 
ends is likely to be the most important legal and policy question with respect to the conflict with 
al Qaeda in the near future. One should expect, for example, court filings by Guantanamo 
detainees asserting an end to the conflict—and thus an end to the underlying law-of-war detention 
authority—once the United States pulls out of Afghanistan and the “practical circumstances of 
[the] conflict [become] entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the 
law of war.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
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enforcement rules and detain without charge or engage in planned, targeted 
killings. 
The United States has responded to this gap in the law by drawing from 
standards developed in the context of international armed conflicts—
standards that yield a broad, geographically unlimited definition of who 
qualifies as a member of the enemy force that can be detained or targeted. 
This has generated a legitimate concern about what Professor Rosa Ehren-
reich Brooks has coined “war everywhere,”22 and sparked a vociferous and 
polarized debate as to the existence of geographic limits on the scope of the 
conflict.23  
This Section addresses the arguments on both sides of the debate, high-
lighting the flawed reasoning of each and the failure to fully account for the 
important liberty and security interests at stake. This sets the stage for a 
new approach—one that acknowledges the state’s need to respond to the 
enemy threat wherever it is located, yet adjusts the response based on 
whether or not the state is acting within a zone of active hostilities. High-
level official statements suggest that in important respects the United States 
is already moving toward such a calibrated approach, albeit as a matter of 
policy rather than law. 
A. The United States’ Approach: 
 The Substantively and Territorially Broad View 
Within days after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush Administration 
proudly announced what became known as a “global war on terror.”24 
Relying on both the President’s Article II Commander-in-Chief authority 
and the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF),25 the executive branch asserted the power to employ law-of-war 
tools anywhere and everywhere the terrorist enemy is found.  
 
22 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 745 (2004) (“[T]he decision to make 
use of legal paradigms relating to armed conflict have brought us into the era of ‘war everywhere,’ 
and rather than a war to end all wars, we are now in a war without end.”).  
23 See supra notes 9-10. 
24 See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United 
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 
2001) (“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”); Brief for Respond-
ents in Opposition at 1, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334), 2004 WL 425739 
(describing a “global armed conflict in which the United States is currently engaged against the al 
Qaeda terrorist network and its supporters”). 
25 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)); see also 
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, The 
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The Obama Administration has been more circumspect. It has grounded 
detention authority solely on the AUMF, eschewing the Bush Administration’s 
reliance on Article II–based authorities; 26  self-consciously dropped the 
“global war on terror” rhetoric;27 and affirmatively bound itself to employing 
detention standards “informed” by the laws of war.28 That said, the deten-
tion authority asserted is, with minor adjustments, just as broad as that 
claimed by the Bush Administration.29 It covers anyone who is “part of” or 
“substantially supported” 30  al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, 
wherever they are found.31 
 
President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations 
Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm 
(describing the President’s “plenary constitutional power” to “deploy military force preemptively 
against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they can 
be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11”).  
26 See Koh, supra note 17 (emphasizing that “the Obama Administration has not based its 
claim of authority to detain . . . on the President’s Article II authority as Commander-in-
Chief. Instead, we have relied on legislative authority expressly granted to the President by 
Congress in the 2001 AUMF.”). 
27 See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf (“The United States 
deliberately uses the word ‘war’ to describe our relentless campaign against al-Qa’ida. However, 
this Administration has made it clear that we are not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the 
religion of Islam. We are at war with a specific organization—al-Qa’ida.”). 
28 See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative 
to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442 
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Respondents’ Memorandum] (“The detention authority 
conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by principles of the laws of war.”); Koh, supra 
note 17 (“[U]nlike the last administration, as a matter of international law, this Administration has 
expressly acknowledged that international law informs the scope of our detention authority.”). 
29 The Obama Administration adopted the detention standard articulated by the Bush 
Administration nearly verbatim, asserting the authority to detain  
persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coali-
tion partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has 
directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.  
Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2. The only definitional change is the added 
requirement that support must be “substantial”—i.e. not “unwitting or insignificant.” Id.  
For the detention standard adopted by the Bush Administration, see Memorandum from Paul 
Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal para. a (July 7, 2004) available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040707review.pdf. Congress endorsed and adopted the Obama Administration’s detention 
standard in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
§ 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1562 (2011) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801). 
30 To date, the Obama Administration has not defended any detention based solely on the 
substantial support prong, and has explicitly disavowed reliance on this detention theory in at least 
one case. See Letter from Sharon Swingle, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Div., to Mark Langer, 
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (filed in Boumediene v. Obama, No. 08-5537 
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Critically, this detention authority rests on an individual’s status as a 
member of (“part of”) the enemy forces and is based on an analogy to the 
rules of international armed conflict. Under these rules, such status makes 
the individual a legitimate military target as well, assuming the person has not 
attempted surrender or is hors de combat (i.e., a sick, wounded, or detained 
fighter).32  
In the context of habeas litigation, the United States has adopted a broad 
understanding of who qualifies as “part of” the enemy force and is therefore a 
legitimate subject of law-of-war detention (and possibly targeting). The 
Executive has proposed, and the D.C. Circuit has endorsed, a “functional 
membership” test, which is essentially a totality-of-the-circumstances test 
with no requirement that the individual engage in any specific, hostile act.33 
Courts have deemed training camp participation highly significant as proof 
of membership, and, at least according to dicta in several D.C. Circuit 
 
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 2009)) (stating that “the Government is not arguing . . . that this Court 
should affirm on the independent ground that the support [the petitioner detainee] provided to al 
Qaida rendered him detainable even if he was functionally part of the organization.” (emphasis in 
original)). It has, however, relied on evidence of support as a basis for establishing membership.  
31 See Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2.  
32 See Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (“[I]ndividuals who are part of al-
Qaida or its associated forces are legitimate military targets.”); Respondents’ Memorandum, supra 
note 28, at 5 (describing the power to detain as a subset of the power to use force “against 
members of an opposing armed force”); Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Dean’s 
Lecture at Yale Law School: National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama 
Administration (Feb. 22, 2012) (emphasizing that there is lawful authority to target any “valid 
military objective[,]” defined to include those who are “part of” the enemy force) (transcript 
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-law-school). The 
Administration apparently bases this argument on an assumption that al Qaeda lacks any “non-
military wing,” making all members potential targets. See Brief for Respondents In Opposition at 
9, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (No. 10-1383). For an argument that this approach 
misconstrues international humanitarian law, see Daphne Eviatar & Gabor Rona, Kill the Kill List, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 31, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/31/kill_the_kill_ 
list. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 41(2), adopted June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (defining persons who are hors de combat). 
33 See, e.g., Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting the D.C. Circuit’s 
adoption of a functional test, rather than a “command structure” test, for determining al Qaeda 
membership); Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (applying a functional 
approach, based on the “totality of the evidence,” to the determination of an individual’s 
membership in al Qaeda and holding that petitioner is, in fact, a member of the organization and 
thus ineligible for habeas relief), aff’d, 655 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011). For a thorough discussion of 
the legal standards applied in habeas litigation, see generally Chesney, supra note 9. See also 
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT M. CHESNEY & LARKIN REYNOLDS, BROOKINGS INST., THE 
EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAK-
ING (2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/5/Guantanamo 
%20wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes.pdf.  
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rulings, may even be independently sufficient. The same is true for guest-
house attendance.34  
Neither the substantive nor evidentiary standards applied in these cases 
vary based on either location of capture or location of activities, at least for 
noncitizens apprehended outside the United States. Thus, in the three 
Guantanamo habeas cases that squarely presented the issue to date—
Bensayah v. Obama (involving a detainee whose capture and relevant 
activities took place in Bosnia),35 Salahi v. Obama (involving a detainee 
captured in Mauritania whose most relevant activities occurred both  
there and in Canada),36 and Almerfedi v. Obama (involving a detainee whose 
capture and relevant activities took place in Iran)37—the location of neither 
the capture nor the activities changed the basic analysis. Rather, the D.C. 
Circuit employed a functional-membership test that was developed to 
establish membership for those who accompanied fighting forces in  
 
34 See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasizing that 
evidence that an individual attended al Qaeda training camps or stayed at an al Qaeda guesthouse 
can constitute “‘overwhelming’ evidence that the United States had authority to detain that 
person” (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010))). To date, the 
Supreme Court has not accepted certiorari of any of the Guantanamo rulings, making the D.C. 
Circuit the de facto final arbiter of who qualifies as “part of” the enemy force, at least for the 
purposes of detentions at Guantanamo.  
35 610 F.3d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Bensayah was arrested in Bosnia in late 2001, turned 
over to the United States, and brought to Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. Id. The D.C. Circuit 
noted al Qaeda’s global reach and endorsed the government’s view that “the AUMF authorizes the 
Executive to detain, at the least, any individual who is functionally part of al Qaeda,” regardless of 
the place of capture or relevant activities. Id. at 725. The court did not address the location of 
capture and activities in its analysis. Ultimately, the court remanded for additional fact-finding, 
which had not yet taken place at the time of this writing. Id. at 727. 
36 625 F.3d 745, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Salahi, who was captured in Mauritania in 2001 and 
transferred to Guantanamo in 2002, had not been to Afghanistan since 1992—a time at which al 
Qaeda and the United States were aligned in their efforts to oust Afghanistan’s Communist 
government. Id. at 748-50. Although the district court granted Salahi’s habeas petition, 710 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010), the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded on the ground that the 
lower court failed to apply a “functional membership” test and instead focused on whether or not 
Salahi fell within al Qaeda’s command structure. Id. at 752-53.  
37 654 F.3d 1, 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Almerfedi, who was arrested in Iran, was not accused of 
engaging in military action against the United States or coalition forces. The D.C. Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 8; see also 725 F. Supp. 2d 18 
(D.D.C. 2010). In concluding that Almerfedi was an “al Qaeda facilitator” who could be detained 
as a functional member of al Qaeda, the court relied on evidence that he stayed with an Islamist 
missionary organization in Iran that was “closely aligned” with al Qaeda, traveled a strange and 
indirect route from his home in Yemen to Iran that was inconsistent with his stated goal of getting 
to Europe, and had at least $2000 of cash on his person when captured. Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 6. 
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Afghanistan. 38  The court also applied the same preponderance of the 
evidence standard that had been used to adjudicate battlefield captures. 
In Padilla v. Hanft39 and Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,40 the Fourth Circuit 
similarly concluded that the authority to detain “enemy combatants” 
applied even to those persons whose apprehension and relevant activities 
occurred in the United States.41 
This broad definition of who qualifies as “part of” the enemy force, coupled 
with the lack of geographic boundaries, has led to a legitimate concern 
about “war everywhere.” If the conflict extends to wherever the non–state 
enemy goes, then the non–state enemy can embroil additional states in the 
conflict merely by crossing state lines and bringing the permissive rules of 
armed conflict along with him. The more expansive the definition of the 
non–state enemy, the greater the erosion of peacetime rules and the broader 
the threat to fundamental liberties. 
The United States and its supporters have attempted to address these 
concerns by pointing to sovereignty and the law of constraints as imposing 
limits on the locations where and manner in which fighting is waged.42 
 
38 See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]here are ways other than 
making a ‘command structure’ showing to prove that a detainee is part of al Qaeda. For example, 
if a group of individuals were captured who were shooting at U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and they 
identified themselves as being members of al Qaeda, it would be immaterial to the government’s 
authority to detain these people whether they were part of the ‘command structure’ of al Qaeda.”); 
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872-73 (focusing on the detainee’s “acknowledged actions—accompanying 
the brigade on the battlefield, carrying a brigade-issued weapon, cooking for the unit, and 
retreating and surrendering under brigade orders” as evidence that the detainee was part of the 
enemy force).  
39 423 F.3d 386, 392 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the President is authorized by the AUMF 
to detain [an American citizen captured on U.S. soil] as a fundamental incident to the conduct of 
war”). But see Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Executive 
does not have the power under the Constitution to detain an American citizen as an enemy 
combatant captured within the United States and far from a conflict zone), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004). For a thorough discussion of the litigation in both Hanft and Al-Marri, see Chesney, supra 
note 9, at 808-19. 
40 534 F.3d 213, 223-25 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment) (per 
curiam), vacated sub nom., al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). 
41 The Fourth Circuit, in a 5–4 split, also ruled that location did matter in evaluating the 
applicable procedural standards. Id. at 216. Notably, however, the ruling appears to turn on al-
Marri’s due process rights as a legal resident detained in the United States. Id. at 262-265, 270-71 
(Traxler, J., concurring in the judgment). It therefore offers little guidance as to the procedural 
rights of noncitizens who lack substantial connections to the United States. See, e.g., United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-75 (1990) (concluding that aliens are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment only if they come within the territory of and establish “substantial connec-
tions” to the United States).  
42 President Obama’s then-Counterterrorism Advisor, John Brennan, for example, has 
emphasized that “[i]nternational legal principles, including respect for a state’s sovereignty and 
the laws of war, impose important constraints on our ability to act unilaterally—and on the way in 
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Recent statements from high-level administration officials also suggest that, 
at least as a matter of policy, out-of-battlefield lethal targeting operations 
focus on those who pose a “significant” threat when capture is not feasible 
and when a strike is “necessary” to mitigate the ongoing threat.43 But there 
is no publicly available definition of what constitutes a “significant” threat 
or the factors that go into deciding when lethal targeting is necessary.44 
Reported practices suggest that these self-imposed policy constraints are 
hardly binding. 
1. Sovereignty-Based Geographical Constraints 
Respect for the state system and its embodiment of Westphalian notions 
of state sovereignty provides a set of territorially based ( jus ad bellum) 
limits on the scope of the conflict, limiting the use of unconsented-to force 
in another state’s territory to those instances in which the state is unable or 
unwilling to effectively suppress the threat.45 This restricts the United 
 
which we can use force—in foreign territories.” See Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra 
note 9. In a 2006 speech, then-Legal Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, John Bellinger, 
similarly suggested geographic limits on the use of force:  
I am not suggesting that, because we remain in a state of armed conflict with al Qaida, 
the United States is free to use military force against al Qaida in any state where an 
al Qaida terrorist may seek shelter. The U.S. military does not plan to shoot terror-
ists on the streets of London. 
Speech at the London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terror Forum (Oct. 31, 
2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/98861.htm; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 9, at 2120 & n.325 (describing law-of-war rules that would potentially constrain the use of 
lethal targeting in the United States).  
43 See Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra, note 13.  
44 As of this writing, the only publicly available document that purports to define the relevant 
factors and criteria is the leaked DOJ White Paper. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 17. But 
the White Paper’s reasoning is explicitly limited to the rules that apply to the targeting of U.S. 
citizens and says nothing about the standards that apply to non-U.S. citizens, who constitute the 
overwhelming majority of targets. In fact, based on publicly available information, Anwar al-
Aulaqi is the only U.S. citizen to be intentionally targeted by a drone strike, out of as many as 
4700 killed. See Jason Evans, Sen. Graham: I Support Drone Strikes, EASLEYPATCH (Feb. 20, 2013) 
available at http://easley.patch.com/articles/sen-graham-i-support-drone-strikes (citing Senator 
Lindsey Graham as asserting that the United States has killed 4700 persons as a result of targeted 
strikes). Three other U.S. citizens are also reported to have been killed, although they do not 
appear to have been specifically targeted. See Ken Dilanian, Brennan CIA Hearings Expose Fears 
About Targeted Drone Killings, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2013, at A1.  
45 For an excellent discussion of the unwilling-or-unable test and its origins in neutrality law, 
see generally Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-
Territorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 491-506 (2012). See also Kenneth Anderson, Stop 
Presses: “Even Eric Posner Says Drone Strikes in Pakistan are Illegal,” LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2012, 8:32 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/10/stop-presses-even-eric-posner-says-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-are-
illegal (defending the unwilling-or-unable test). The question of which factors are relevant to 
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States’ use of unconsented-to force against al Qaeda and its associates to 
failed states (such as Somalia), ungoverned regions within states (such as 
the northwest province of Pakistan), or state supporters of terrorism (such 
as Afghanistan under the Taliban leadership). By comparison, the use of 
unconsented-to force in London or Munich is generally prohibited, given 
that the United Kingdom and Germany are able and willing to respond to 
the threat posed by terrorists on their soil, albeit through law enforcement 
mechanisms.46 
Such territorially based limitations, however, are generally presumed to 
recede if a state consents to the use of force. Imagine, for example, that the 
United States learns that an al Qaeda operative is traveling to Montreal for 
a meeting with a potential collaborator. Imagine, further, that the Canadian 
government is unwilling to arrest the individual under its domestic laws, 
wants to avoid the spectacle of a U.S.-orchestrated capture, and instead 
gives the United States the green light to launch a drone strike. Imagine, 
finally, that U.S. intelligence determines in advance the precise location of 
the meeting and concludes that it could strike with precision in a manner 
consistent with the principle of proportionality. Under the territorially 
broad view of the conflict, nothing, as a matter of state sovereignty, would 
prevent the United States from taking military action to kill that individual 
(although there would likely be strong policy reasons not to do so). 
This hypothetical might not pose a concern were one convinced that: (1) 
the individual is who we think he is, (2) there will be no collateral damage, 
and (3) the individual poses a grave threat that cannot be addressed through 
other means. But there are reasons to be concerned about each of these 
assumptions—reasons that expose the fundamental problems with the 
United States’ approach and its analogy to the law of international armed 
conflict.  
2. Law-of-War Constraints on the Manner of Fighting— 
The Principles of Distinction and Proportionality 
Scholars dating back to Cicero have long stressed the need for restraint 
in the exercise of wartime actions so as to ensure that the return to peace is 
 
determining that a state is unable or unwilling to appropriately respond to a threat remains highly 
unsettled.  
46 This assumes that the United Kingdom and Germany agree with the United States’ 
assessment of who qualifies as a terrorist enemy. If, by contrast, the United States determines that 
an individual is a legitimate target and the host state refuses to intervene, this constraint on the 
use of force might disappear.  
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possible.47 Over time this has developed into the widely accepted norm that 
what is permitted by military necessity must be tempered by respect for 
humanity. This in turn has been integrated into the central, operational 
principles of distinction and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering, as well 
as the related rule of proportionality.48 The principle of distinction requires 
that states distinguish between civilians and belligerents and mandates that 
civilians and civilian objects may not be the targets of attack.49 The rule of 
proportionality prohibits military attacks that cause loss and damage to 
civilians and civilian objects that are excessive in relation to the military 
advantage to be gained.50 Together, these requirements impose cardinal 
limits on a belligerent state’s military response to an identified threat.  
 Scholars have pointed to these rules as a means of addressing concerns 
about erroneous deprivations of life and liberty of both targets and innocent 
bystanders. 51  Under this view, the principle of distinction, if properly 
applied, identifies and distinguishes legitimate targets from others. The 
requirement of proportionality protects the interests of innocent bystanders. 
 
47 See 1 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS ch. XI, para. 35 (Walter Miller trans., 
Harv. Univ. Press 1913) (“The only excuse . . . for going to war is that we may live in peace 
unharmed . . . .”). 
48 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the law of international armed conflict 
as “predicated on a subtle equilibrium between the two diametrically opposed stimulants of 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations”). 
49 Id. at 8. See also U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 5-9 
(1976) (“The requirement that attacks be limited to military objectives results from several 
requirements of international law. The mass annihilation of enemy people is neither humane, 
permissible, nor militarily necessary.”) 
50 See DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 130 (“The quintessence of proportionality is that collateral 
damage to civilians and civilian objects—caused by an attack against lawful targets—must not be 
expected to be ‘excessive.’”); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 
8(2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (defining “war crimes” to include “[i]ntentionally 
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
supra note 32, art. 57(2) (requiring the taking of “all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects”). 
51 See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed?, Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the Inter-
national Legal Regulation of Lethal Force (emphasizing that the “strict-geographic approach [is not] a 
sensible way to address concerns about the individual scope of targeting authority; such concerns 
can and should be addressed by a[n] application of the principle of distinction and related concepts 
from within [International Humanitarian Law] itself”), in 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 37 (M.N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2010).  
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But the degree to which the principles of distinction and proportionality 
effectively serve this purpose depends directly on the definition of “combatant” 
being employed.52 On the one hand, an overly narrow definition of combatant 
unduly ties the belligerent state’s hand, prohibiting it from using force 
against those that ought to be legitimate targets. On the other hand, an 
overbroad definition of combatant fails to provide meaningful constraints on 
the state’s potential use of force. In the United States, it is precisely the 
breadth of the functional combatant definition, as laid out by the executive 
branch and endorsed by the courts, that has elevated concerns about over-
expansive detention, targeting practices, and “war everywhere.”  
Meanwhile, though proportionality requirements minimize the suffering 
of innocent civilians, they do not and cannot eliminate such risks. To the 
contrary, the laws of war accept that civilian casualties may be the expected 
consequence of an attack, so long as such casualties are not excessive in 
relation to the military advantage gained.53 As the definition of legitimate 
target expands, the risk to civilians—who are more likely to be collateral 
damage in an increasing number of presumptively legitimate attacks—
increases. Even if the target is accurately identified, there is always the 
possibility, and frequent reality, of collateral damage. This can be caused by 
a civilian wandering by at the last minute, by technological failures, by 
intelligence failures, or by a combination of all three. Statistics from targeting 
operations in northwest Pakistan suggest that this is a legitimate concern.54  
 
52 This of course assumes that the category of “combatant,” or its functional equivalent, 
carries over to a noninternational armed conflict and provides a sufficient basis for lethal 
targeting—issues about which there is ongoing debate.  
53 Some have suggested that the requirement that states take “feasible” precautions in the 
means and methods of attack to minimize civilian death, specified in Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), supra note 32, art. 57(2), mandates capture whenever doing so is 
feasible and would yield a lower likelihood of civilian casualties. But this is hardly a universal 
interpretation. Moreover, even if this interpretation were the correct one, it does little to respond 
to the situation in which a commander’s expectation is that a strike will yield little to no collateral 
damage and therefore satisfies this test, but the expectation turns out to be wrong. It also does not 
address or weigh the collateral damage concerns in places like Yemen and Somalia where law 
enforcement is not likely to be a feasible alternative. These concerns suggest the need for a 
carefully circumscribed definition of who qualifies as a legitimate target, along with an explicit 
least-harmful-means test and meaningful procedural protections, as detailed in Part III. 
54 See Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 
283, 330-33 (2011) (compiling estimates of civilian deaths resulting from targeted-killing operations 
in northwest Pakistan). For an account of civilian casualties resulting from targeted killings in 
Yemen, see Gregory Johnsen, Signature Strikes in Yemen, BIG THINK (April 19, 2012, 2:45 PM), 
http://bigthink.com/waq-al-waq/signature-strikes-in-yemen (listing civilian casualties resulting from 
strikes in Yemen). 
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Finally, even if the combatant category were appropriately delineated 
and strikes were carried out with perfect precision, identification problems 
would continue to pose significant concerns. In international armed 
conflict, the enemy forces typically wear uniforms, carry arms openly, 
and, if captured, have an incentive to self-identify (so as to obtain prisoner-
of-war status). By contrast, the enemy in this conflict does not self-identify 
as such, but blends in with the civilian population. In fact, the enemy’s 
entire modus operandi depends on the ability to hide, which in turn increases 
the possibility of mistake.55 Even the world’s best intelligence agencies have 
made documented mistakes in the past. 56  In targeting operations, the 
identification mistake is irreversible. In detention operations, the mistake 
can be corrected, but with costs to both individual liberty and state legitimacy. 
3. Additional Policy Constraints 
Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter 
of law, the United States continues to press a broad definition of the enemy 
force, its actions, as a matter of policy, are more restrained. Specifically, it 
focuses its targeted-killing operations on those who pose a “significant 
threat”57 and only as a matter of last resort. In the words of John Brennan, 
the United States does not seek to kill every al Qaeda member, but instead 
focuses its efforts on “disrupt[ing] . . . plans and . . . plots before they 
come to fruition,”58 and limits lethal strikes to situations in which it is the 
“only recourse” against the threat. 59  Brennan cites operational leaders, 
 
55 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 60 (2006) (“The danger of erro-
neously identifying an individual as an enemy of the United States is therefore much greater than 
in a conventional war.”); Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and 
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1383 (2008) (describing “terrorist 
networks [as] tak[ing] the identification problems long posed by guerrilla warfare to new 
heights”). 
56 In July 1973, for example, the Israeli Mossad reportedly assassinated an innocent Moroccan 
waiter in Lillehammer, Norway, mistaking him for a member of the Black September faction 
responsible for the Munich massacre. See Doug Mellgren, Norway Solves Riddle of Mossad Killing, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2000), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/mar/02/israel. The United 
States has also taken custody of persons who are widely believed to have been innocent, including, 
for example, Khalid al-Masri. See, e.g., Dana Priest, The Wronged Man, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 
2006, at C1. Had al-Masri been targeted instead of detained, the consequences would have been 
irreversible. See also Johnsen, supra note 54 (describing a 2009 strike intended for an al Qaeda 
training camp that instead hit a Bedouin encampment and killed “more than 40 civilians”). 
57 See Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9; Brennan, Wilson Center 
Remarks, supra note 13, and accompanying text. 
58 Id.  
59 Interview by Margaret Warner, Senior Correspondent, PBS NewsHour, with John O. 
Brennan, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism (Aug. 8, 2012) (transcript 
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operatives in the midst of training for an attack, and persons who possess 
unique operational skills that are being leveraged for an attack.60 But no 
binding limits have yet been articulated, and it is not clear that they exist.61 
Are the examples of possible targets exclusive or merely illustrative? How 
far along does the attack planning need to be? Is mere agreement to plot or 
plan enough? In what situations is lethal targeting considered the “only 
recourse”? 
Of note, recent reporting suggests that the United States has launched 
at least one drone strike near Sana’a, the capital of Yemen, in a region 
readily accessible to law enforcement officials, thereby casting doubt on 
official assertions that lethal targeting is used as a measure of last resort, 
when capture is not feasible.62 Moreover, “signature strikes” reportedly 
were approved for use in Yemen in 2012, allowing the targeting of individuals 
or groups based on their pattern of activities without knowing the specific 
targets’ identities or roles in the organization—a practice that seems to belie 
a policy of individualized assessments of “significant threat.”63  
 
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/transcript-of-john-brennans-speech-at-the-council-
on-foreign-relations) (“[I]f our only recourse is to take legal action in concert with partners and 
provide our partners some assistance in that regard or to do things with them that [will] mitigate 
threat, we do it, but because it presents a terrorist threat to U.S. persons, properties, entities.”); 
see also Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (asserting that “our unqualified preference 
is to only undertake lethal force when we believe that capturing the individual is not feasible”).  
60 Brennan, Interview with Margaret Warner, supra note 59. 
61 As discussed above, the most detailed explanation to date of standards employed is the 
recently released DOJ White Paper, but its application is limited to U.S. citizens. See DOJ 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 17. Moreover, the White Paper does not even define the outer limits of 
permissible attacks on U.S. citizens, explicitly stating that it is merely describing one instance in 
which such killings are permissible and “does not attempt to determine the minimum require-
ments necessary.” Id. at 1. 
62 See, e.g., Adam Baron, Family, Neighbors of Yemeni Killed by U.S. Drone Wonder Why He 
Wasn’t Taken Alive, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/ 
2012/11/28/175794/family-neighbors-of-yemeni-killed.html; Gregory Johnsen, Adnan al-Qadhi and 
the Day After, BIG THINK (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://bigthink.com/waq-al-waq/adnan-al-
qadhi-and-the-day-after. The aforementioned DOJ White Paper suggests that lack of consent by 
the host government may justify a finding that capture is not feasible—which possibly explains 
how this strike was justified. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 8 (“[R]egarding the 
feasibility of capture, capture would not be feasible if . . . the relevant country were to decline to 
consent to a capture operation.”). It remains unclear whether there is any obligation on the United 
States to take steps to secure such consent or cooperation.  
63 See Greg Miller, U.S. Drone Campaign in Yemen Expanded, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2012, at 
A8 (“The expanded authority will allow [strikes] . . . on targets based solely on their intelligence 
‘signatures’—patterns of behavior that are detected through signals intercepts, human sources and 
aerial surveillance and that indicate the presence of an important operative or a plot against U.S. 
citizens.”); Cora Currier & Justin Elliot, The Drone War Doctrine We Still Know Nothing About, 
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/drone-war-doctrine-we-know-
nothing-about (“[L]ast spring the U.S. reportedly expanded signature strikes to Yemen, though 
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B. The Territorially Restricted View 
Responding to the United States’ approach, a number of scholars, human 
rights groups, and other commentators have sought to impose what Professor 
Kenneth Anderson has called a “legal geography of war.”64 This argument 
seeks to narrow the scope of who can be detained and targeted by limiting 
the geographic reach of the laws of war, rather than by (or in addition to) 
focusing on the standards for detention and targeting themselves.65 The 
arguments have sounded in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but the impulse is 
the same: to impose territorial-based limits on the use of law-of-war tools.  
The jus ad bellum argument focuses on the legality of the conflict: in a 
post–United Nations Charter world, one must establish a legitimate basis to 
use unconsented-to force in another state’s territory based either on self-
defense or a Security Council resolution justifying the use of such force.66 
Proponents of the territorially limited view of the conflict argue that, 
whereas there was both a self-defense justification and Security Council 
resolution justifying use of force in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and the 
Taliban (as the entity harboring al Qaeda), there is no such justification for 
the use of force in other nations based solely on the fact that certain al 
Qaeda members or associated forces are found there.67  
 
administration officials said there were stricter standards than in Pakistan and evidence of a threat 
to the U.S. or U.S. interests was required.”).  
64 KENNETH ANDERSON, HOOVER INST., TARGETED KILLING AND DRONE WARFARE 2-3 
(2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Anderson. 
pdf (noting that historically there was an “implied geography of war” based on “where hostilities 
took place” but that drones disturb this long-accepted boundedness of war). 
65 There is also a separate, important, and ongoing debate about who can be targeted and 
detained in a transnational conflict with a non–state actor, separate and apart from the debate about 
the geography of the conflict. Views range from those who agree that rules should be derived from 
those applicable in an international armed conflict, see, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 
2091, to those who argue for the application of human rights law norms, see, e.g., Gabor Rona, A 
Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the United States, 39 CAL. W. 
INT’L. L.J. 135, 148 (2008), to those who argue for a hybrid approach, see, e.g., Gabriella Blum & 
Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 145, 159-65 
(2010).  
A related and important debate addresses who properly qualifies as taking a “direct part in 
hostilities” and is therefore a legitimate military target. See generally NILS MELZER, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009); W. 
Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, 
and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010). The underlying assumption in all 
of these debates is that the applicable criteria should apply consistently throughout the applicable 
scope of conflict. This zone approach challenges that underlying assumption.  
66 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. arts. 39-42 & 51.  
67 See, e.g., Letter from Anthony D. Romero, Exec. Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union, to 
President Barack Obama (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-4-28-
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The jus in bello argument focuses on the existence of an armed conflict, 
as opposed to the legality of the conflict, but also does so on a state-by-state 
basis. Proponents of this approach generally treat the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ruling in Prosecutor v. Tadic as 
laying out the governing standard for determining the existence of a 
noninternational armed conflict. Under this standard, such a conflict 
exists when there is “protracted armed violence” involving “organized 
armed groups.”68 Applying these factors, scholars and other commentators 
argue that, while a conflict may exist with al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the 
border regions of Pakistan, it does not exist outside those areas.69 Thus, 
even if another state consents to the use of force on its territory (thereby 
addressing the jus ad bellum concerns), it is illegitimate to use law-of-war 
tools to detain or target members of the enemy armed forces because the 
armed conflict does not extend to that state.70 
 
ACLULettertoPresidentObama.pdf (advocating that “[t]he entire world is not a war zone, and 
wartime tactics that may be permitted on the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be 
deployed anywhere in the world where a terrorism suspect happens to be located”); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Killing Awlaki was Illegal, Immoral and Dangerous, CNN WORLD (Oct. 1, 2011), 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/01/killing-awlaki-was-illegal-immoral-and-dangerous 
(“[E]very American knows that the U.S. is not engaged in an armed conflict in Yemen—not a real 
armed conflict. Nevertheless, President Obama placed an American citizen in Yemen on a kill list.”).  
68 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm, accord Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 152 (1997), http://www.cidh. 
org/annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm; Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judge-
ment, ¶ 619 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/40278fbb4.pdf; INT'L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION 
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD: COMMENTARY 49 (Jean 
S. Pictet ed., 1952). 
69 Some have also suggested that there is a separate noninternational armed conflict between 
Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), that the United States has intervened in 
this conflict on behalf of Yemen, and that it is therefore engaged in a separate noninternational 
armed conflict with AQAP. See, e.g., Benjamin R. Farley, Targeting Anwar Al-Aulaqi: A Case Study 
in U.S. Drone Strikes and Targeted Killing, 2 AMER. U. NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 57, 71-73 (2012) 
(“United States operations in Yemen, including airstrikes targeting AQAP on behalf of the 
Yemeni government, constitute an armed intervention into Yemen’s non-international armed 
conflict.”). But see O’Connell Declaration, supra note 10, at para. 15 (“[T]he United States is not 
engaged in armed conflict in Yemen.”). For opposing views on the geographic reach of armed 
conflict, see Predator Drones and Targeted Killing, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www. 
fed-soc.org/publications/detail/predator-drones-and-targeted-killings-podcast, in which Ben Wizner, 
Litigation Director of the American Civil Liberties Union National Security Project, and Professor 
Michael Lewis consider the legality of drone strikes against U.S. citizens in Yemen. 
70 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killings with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 
2004–2009 (arguing that a state may not consent to the use of military force on its territory in the 
absence of armed conflict hostilities), in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
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This approach, however, suffers from both positivist and normative 
flaws. Treaty law does not provide the clear answers that proponents of this 
approach suggest. Noninternational armed conflicts were initially assumed 
to take place solely within the territory of a state, and, as a result, the 
Geneva framers simply did not address the situation in which a state is 
engaged in a conflict with a non–state actor whose presence spans multiple 
states. The Conventions are thus silent as to the scope of a conflict with 
such attributes.71 Moreover, in connection with international armed conflicts 
(or conflicts between states), Geneva’s drafters actually sought for the law 
of international armed conflict to have the broadest possible reach so as to 
prevent nations from resorting to unregulated warfare.72 
Similarly, neither case law nor state practice provides clear answers to 
the question of the geographic reach of the conflict, and are probably best 
read to support a territorially broad view. The leading and oft-cited ICTY 
case on point, Prosecutor v. Tadic, describes the conflict as extending to the 
state’s borders as a way to expand, not restrict, the scope of the conflict.73 
Whether or not the conflict extends beyond state borders was irrelevant to 
that case. State practice is also rife with examples of states crossing borders 
to attack belligerent non–state actors that have set up operations in neighboring 
states.74 
As a policy matter, the territorially restricted approach also creates safe 
havens for the non–state enemy, allowing it to cross state lines to regroup, 
plan, and coordinate externally directed plots free from the threat of 
attack.75  To the extent that the threat can be appropriately addressed 
 
THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE 263, 280 (Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani & Saskia Hufnagel eds., 
2012).  
71 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: COMMENTARY 27-44 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. 
deHeney trans., 1960) (describing “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”(emphasis added)). 
72 See id. at 19-20 (explaining that the broadly applicable term “armed conflict” was chosen to 
avoid the situation in which belligerent parties deny the existence of a state of war so as to 
circumvent the obligations imposed by the laws of war).  
73 See Tadic, No. IT-94-1-1, Interlocutory Appeal at ¶ 70 (rejecting petitioner’s argument that 
the Tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged crimes took place at a prison 
camp that petitioner asserted was outside the scope of the armed conflict); Ohlin, supra note 9, 
manuscript at 18-19 (arguing that the effort to impose geographic limits on the scope of the 
conflict is based on a “profound misreading of the logic of Tadic”).  
74 See Chesney, supra note 51, at 36 (describing the “endless examples of a party to an existing 
armed conflict using force in the territory of another state which until then was not experiencing 
hostilities within its own borders, in order to prevent establishment of a safe haven”). 
75 Some proponents of a territorially restricted view acknowledge that those who are plan-
ning or coordinating attacks within the conflict zone may be subject to law-of-war authorities even 
if they have crossed state lines. According to this view, the Taliban and al Qaeda leaders directing 
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through foreign cooperation and law enforcement means, that might not be 
particularly troubling. But what if the foreign government is unable or 
unwilling to respond to the threat, and capture by the belligerent state is 
infeasible? Alternatively, what if the foreign government is supportive of the 
belligerent state’s efforts to arrest and prosecute the enemy, but information 
about the target, at least initially, comes primarily from intelligence reporting 
that cannot be introduced in open court without revealing a critical source or 
jeopardizing a key relationship with a foreign power?76 Under the territorially 
restricted view, even short-term law-of-war detention is prohibited, and 
even if carried out for the express purpose of gathering information for a 
criminal prosecution (as was done in Warsame’s case).77 
 
attacks in Kabul from northwest Pakistan (or elsewhere) would be legitimate military targets 
subject to law-of-war detention or lethal targeting. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Bobby Chesney 
Responds to My Post, OPINIO JURIS (Sep. 25, 2010, 9:24 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/25/ 
bobby-chesney-responds-to-my-post (arguing that international humanitarian law “applies to 
individuals located outside the battlefield only if they are members of an organization involved in 
that [noninternational armed conflict] or are directly participating in hostilities there”). But an 
affiliated but distinct group of al Qaeda operatives in Yemen who are planning an attack in 
Germany or the United States would not be a legitimate target, absent a separate finding of 
imminent threat justifying an attack in self-defense.  
76 Some commentators have responded to the concern about safe havens by noting that grave 
threats can still be dealt with as a matter of self-defense, even if there is no law-of-war basis for 
the use of force or detention without charge. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of 
Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 
237, 238-41 (2010) (“[A]n armed attack by a non-state actor . . . can trigger the right of self-
defense . . . even if selective responsive force directed against a non-state actor occurs within a 
foreign country.”). And in fact, the United States has itself increasingly invoked self-defense, 
along with law-of-war authorities, as justifying targeted killings in places such as Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia. See Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9. But the rules governing 
the use of force in self-defense outside the context of armed conflict are arguably even more 
unsettled than those with respect to the use of force based on the law of war. The United States, 
for example, has argued for a “flexible interpretation of imminence.” See id. (“We are finding 
increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of 
‘imminence’ may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups . . . .”); see also DOJ 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 7 (adopting a broad definition of “imminent”). Such a framework 
presumably would allow it to target high-level leaders even if there were no evidence that they 
were participating in or coordinating a specific, imminent attack. A self-defense rationale could 
easily result in the aforementioned concern of “war everywhere,” albeit pursuant to a different 
legal framework. Brooks, supra note 22.  
77 Following the announcement that Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame would receive a trial in 
federal court, the American Civil Liberties Union summarized its position and reasoning as 
follows:  
[T]he Obama administration will prosecute Warsame in the criminal justice sys-
tem. . . . But the Obama administration has put a criminal conviction at risk by 
holding Warsame in unlawful military detention for over two months. The govern-
ment could have obtained intelligence through law enforcement rather than military 
 
  
2013] The Geography of the Battlefield 1191 
 
Finally, the underlying assumption behind the territorially restricted 
view of armed conflict—that geographic limitations will result in the 
replacement of the permissive rules of law of armed conflict with restrictive 
rules of international human rights norms—is itself subject to debate. The 
United States has long taken the position that the treaty-based obligations 
embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights do 
not apply extraterritorially.78 This position has been sharply criticized by 
numerous scholars, as well as the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
yet the United States is unlikely to alter its views, at least in the near 
future.79 Moreover, accepting that the human rights obligation to respect 
life applies independent of any treaty-based obligations,80 it is not clear how 
this norm would apply in the context of most targeted killings. While the 
extrajudicial killing of a person who is in the state’s custody or hors de 
combat is clearly prohibited, human rights law does not neatly address the 
 
interrogation, as it successfully has in hundreds of terrorism cases, without jeopard-
izing its criminal case.  
Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Supports Moving Terror Suspect to U.S. Court 
but Questions Unlawful Military Detention (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
national-security/aclu-supports-moving-terror-suspect-us-court-questions-unlawful-military-
detention. 
78 See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). For the United States’ reading 
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights to apply “only to individuals who 
are both within the territory of a State Party and subject to that State Party’s sovereign authority”, 
see U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2003: United States 
of America, Annex I, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization/124143.pdf; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law 
and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 251-52 (2010) (explaining the George W. 
Bush Administration’s position that “a person would have to be both ‘within’ a state’s territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction for any covenant protections to apply”); Michael J. Dennis, Application of 
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 119, 123-24 (2005) (arguing that the drafting history of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights supports the view of the United States). 
79 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ 
Add.13 (Mar. 26, 2004) (“[T]here is a United Nations Charter obligation to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights . . . .”). 
80 The obligation to respect life is generally considered a norm of customary international 
human rights law. See, e.g., David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial 
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 184-85 (2005) (noting that “the 
duty to respect the right of life” has become a peremptory norm of customary international law 
regardless of a particular state’s treaty obligations). This norm, however, does not answer the 
question as to the degree to, and manner in, which this obligation restricts a state’s use of lethal 
force in response to an alleged terrorist threat. 
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situation in which the United States takes action with respect to a purported 
terrorist threat driving down a desert road in Yemen.81  
Similarly, with respect to detention, human rights law does not provide 
much in the way of substantive limits. In fact, human rights norms explicitly 
permit the use of administrative detention without any clear standards as to 
who may be detained under such an administrative detention regime.82  
II. A NEW APPROACH: ZONES OF ACTIVE 
HOSTILITIES AND BEYOND 
The current debate has resulted in a stalemate, with neither side ade-
quately addressing the legitimate concerns of the other. The notion of an 
on–off switch, in which the state’s ability to go after the enemy is restricted 
to limited territorial regions, ignores the geographically unbounded nature 
of a conflict with a transnational non–state actor. Conversely, the notion of 
an unbounded conflict raises legitimate concerns about the use of force as a 
first resort and the erosion of peacetime norms in areas far from any 
recognized “hot” battlefield. What is needed is a new framework of domestic 
and international law that better balances the multiple security and liberty 
interests at stake.  
This Article offers such a framework—one that recognizes the broad 
scope of the conflict, but distinguishes between zones of active hostilities 
and elsewhere in setting the procedural and substantive standards for 
detention and targeting. This framework, which I call the zone approach, 
accommodates the state’s key security interests while also protecting against 
the erosion of peacetime norms outside zones of active hostilities. It 
recognizes that rules applicable in wartime—rules that permit killing and 
 
81 See Kretzmer, supra note 80, at 177 (describing unresolved issues regarding the right to life 
under a law enforcement and international human rights law model); Chesney, supra note 51, at 
49-50 (contemplating the various arguments regarding the application of international human 
rights law as applied to the case of Anwar al Aulaki); Paust, supra note 76, at 264-65 (arguing that 
human rights law does not protect targeted persons who are not within the jurisdiction or effective 
control of a country engaged in self-defense or law-of-war targeting). But see Al-Skeini v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, ¶ 136 Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 7, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105606 (suggesting that, at least under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, “the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the 
individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s Article I [of the Convention] 
jurisdiction”). 
82 For an excellent discussion of detention schemes governed by international human rights 
law, see generally Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving 
Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369, 382-89 (2008).  See also John 
B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four 
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 209-13 (2011) 
(discussing the difficulty of identifying and applying the relevant human rights rules). 
  
2013] The Geography of the Battlefield 1193 
 
detention without charge based on status alone—should be the exception 
rather than the norm, limited to circumstances in which security so 
demands. 
This Part outlines the several normative and practical reasons why the 
zone approach should be adopted and incorporated into U.S. and, ultimately, 
international law. Although the analysis focuses primarily on the United 
States, the arguments as to the benefits of this framework apply equally to 
any other belligerent state seeking to defeat a transnational non–state 
enemy. 
A. Basis for the Distinction 
There is an intuitive sense that, separate and apart from any sovereignty 
concerns, the killing or detention of an alleged enemy of the state in a war 
zone is different from the killing or detention of an alleged enemy in a 
peaceful zone (think Munich or London), even if the known facts about the 
enemy’s role in the opposing force are the same. Similarly, there is a less 
intuitive, but equally important, difference between both of those situations 
and the killing or detention of an alleged enemy in a lawless zone (think 
Yemen or Somalia). This Section highlights several reasons why these 
distinctions should be reflected in the law—reasons largely based on the 
relevant exigency, the importance of notice, and the intrinsic value of 
cabining war and its permissive use of force and detention without charge. 
1. The War Zone Versus the Peaceful Zone 
The exigencies that justify application of wartime rules simply do not 
apply outside zones of active hostilities. The Supreme Court recognized 
this important distinction in Reid v. Covert,83 in which it ruled that civilians 
accompanying the armed forces outside a war zone could not be subject to 
military trial. “The exigencies which have required military rule on the 
battlefield are not present where no conflict exists. Military trial of civilians 
‘in the field’ is an extraordinary jurisdiction and it should not be expanded 
at the expense of the Bill of Rights.”84 The Reid opinion echoed the reason-
ing of a case from almost ninety years prior, when the Court ruled that 
Indiana—which was not the site of any active fighting—could not be subject 
to martial law during the Civil War: “Martial law cannot arise from a 
threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion 
 
83 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957). 
84 Id. 
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real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administra-
tion.”85 Similar reasoning has led courts to conclude that the requisition of 
property by the United States government is permitted at the “scene of 
conflict” but not thousands of miles away86 and that the protections of the 
Suspension Clause depend to a large extent on whether or not the detainees 
are held in an “active theater of war.”87  
As these cases recognize, the existence of warlike conditions in one part 
of the world should not lead to a relaxation of the substantive and procedural 
standards embodied in peacetime rules elsewhere. In some areas, intense 
fighting can create conditions that often make it impracticable, if not 
impossible, to apply ordinary peacetime rules. Such situations justify resort 
to more expedient wartime rules. By contrast, in areas where ordinary 
institutions are functioning, domestic police are effectively maintaining law 
and order, and communication and transportation networks are undisturbed, 
the exigent circumstances justifying the reliance on law-of-war tools are 
typically absent.88 In those areas, the peacetime standards—which them-
selves reflect a careful balancing of liberty and security interests—serve the 
important functions of minimizing error and abuse and enhancing the 
legitimacy of the state’s actions. These standards should be respected absent 
exigent circumstances that justify an exception.  
Second, the notion of a global conflict clashes with the legitimate and 
reasonable expectations of persons residing in a peacetime zone. These 
expectations matter. The corollary—the requirement of fair notice—is 
perhaps the primary factor that distinguishes a law-abiding government from 
a lawless dictatorship. Its importance is emphasized time and time again in 
both U.S. constitutional law and international law doctrines. It sets bounda-
 
85 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). 
86 Filbin Corp. v. United States, 266 F. 911, 917 (E.D.S.C. 1920); see also id. (“A state of war 
does not sanction summary requisitions for all purposes everywhere, but only in those places in 
which, by the necessities of the conflict, martial law is in force and civil law is suspended.”). 
87 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But see Ex parte Kanai, 46 F. Supp. 
286, 288 (E.D. Wis. 1942) (upholding an order requiring persons of Japanese descent to evacuate 
San Francisco based on the conclusion that the “field of military operation is not confined to the 
scene of actual physical combat”); United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 764 
(E.D.N.Y. 1920) (describing “the territory of the United States” as “certainly within the field of 
active operations” during World War I and upholding the court-martial of an alleged spy captured 
in New York). 
88 The boundaries between these two areas will not always be clear-cut. But the inevitable 
messiness of the situation on the ground does not negate the basic insight that the exigencies 
created by intense, sustained fighting do not exist, at least not in any sustained way, in places far 
removed from any battlefield setting. 
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ries on substantive rights,89 is key to choice of law questions,90 and is the 
core of procedural-rights protections in both domestic and international 
law.91 
In places of intense, obvious, and publicly acknowledged fighting, civilians 
are on notice that they are residing within a zone of conflict. Those who 
remain within the conflict zone have implicitly accepted some risk, albeit 
not voluntarily in most cases. They can, at least in theory, take steps to 
protect themselves and minimize the likelihood of being caught in the 
crossfire by, when possible, leaving or avoiding areas with the heaviest 
concentration of fighters or taking extra precautions in conducting their 
daily activities.92 Host states are similarly on notice of the likelihood of 
ongoing hostilities and can take appropriate steps to move their citizens 
away from areas of intense fighting.  
 
89 For example, Fourth Amendment protections apply to “reasonable” or “justifiable” expec-
tations of privacy. See, e.g., Rakas v. United States, 439 U.S. 128, 142-44 (1978) (linking the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections to the “legitimate expectation of privacy”); United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion) (stating that the Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on 
whether an expectation of privacy is “justifiable”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) 
(noting that reasonable searches necessarily require compliance with a “judicial process” and that 
“searches conducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few . . . exceptions”).  
90 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317-18 & n.24 (plurality opinion) 
(emphasizing the lack of “unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations” in holding an 
insurance company subject to the laws of Minnesota). 
91 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 78, art. 15 (“No 
one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed.”); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to comport 
with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited . . . .”); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 501 (1998) 
(plurality opinion) (“Retroactive legislation . . . presents problems of unfairness . . . because it 
can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.” (quoting Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992))); Steel v. United Kingdom (No. 91), 1998-VII 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 2720, 2766-67 (1998) (“Two requirements flow from the expression ‘prescribed by 
law’ . . . . These requirements are first that the law be adequately accessible to citizens, and 
secondly that the law be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct and foresee with reasonable certitude the consequences . . . .”). 
92 The ability of civilians to take such precautionary measures is often extremely limited in 
situations in which the non–state enemy has purposefully diffused itself among the civilian 
population. In some cases, it also may be near impossible to leave a conflict zone due to risks of 
travel, health constraints, or political barriers, such as the closing of border crossings. That said, 
the heavy refugee flows out of places like Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that there is at least some 
possibility of departing a zone of active hostilities, albeit often at extraordinarily high financial, 
physical, and emotional costs. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N FOR REFUGEES, 
GLOBAL TRENDS 2011, at 14 fig.5 (2012) (identifying Afghanistan and Iraq as the two main 
source countries of refugees in 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4fd6f87f9.html. 
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By comparison, civilians sitting at an outdoor café in Paris are not on 
notice that they are within the zone of conflict. As a result, there is something 
intuitively unsettling about the idea that they could be deemed the legiti-
mate collateral damage of a state-sponsored attack. It is precisely this fear of 
the unpredictable on which terrorists capitalize when they attack unsuspecting 
civilians. A legal doctrine that allows the state to engage in attacks that may 
have a similar consequence—even if civilians are not the intended or 
expected targets of the attacks—raises legitimate concerns.  
It is, of course, possible to conceive of a new set of rules for this new 
type of conflict, under which the procedural and substantive requirements 
of domestic criminal justice systems and human rights norms give way 
when the non–state enemy crosses into one’s jurisdiction. But the idea that 
a non–state actor could, through its clandestine behavior, trigger the 
permissive use of killing and detention without charge runs counter to 
longstanding conceptions of fairness and justice.93 It essentially allows the 
terrorist to erode protections of basic rights simply by crossing state lines. 
Third, the conditions on the ground affect the assumptions as to who 
qualifies as the enemy. While it may be valid to presume that individuals 
who attend a training camp and are found in a zone of active hostilities 
intend to join the fight, the same presumption does not necessarily hold for 
individuals who are subsequently located thousands of miles away in a zone 
of relative peace. 94 Absent additional, specific information suggesting that 
the individual is actively engaged in attack planning or playing a sufficiently 
important role in the organization so as to pose a significant ongoing threat, 
the justifications for law-of-war detention or lethal killing (to prevent the 
return to the battlefield or otherwise eliminate the threat) are questionable.95 
At a minimum, heightened quantum-of-information standards ought to 
 
93 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (explaining that a 
set of rules that change so frequently that citizens lack notice and the ability to comply is not just a 
bad system of law, but not a system of law at all). 
94 I also question whether a key factor used to establish functional membership—guesthouse 
attendance—suffices even within a zone of active hostilities. For an insightful analysis, see 
Benjamin Wittes, The Significance of Guesthouses and Training, LAWFARE (June 11, 2011, 12:39 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/the-significance-of-guesthouses-and-training (“Memo to the 
D.C. Circuit: Staying at a guesthouse is not the same as taking military training.”). 
95 There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. For example, a high concentration of 
such individuals in a particular area, even outside a zone of active hostilities, could be grounds for 
significant concern. Under the framework proposed in this Article, the state would still be able to 
respond with force to such threats; it simply would have to meet the higher substantive and 
procedural standards for doing so.  
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apply to detention and targeting that take place outside a zone of active 
hostilities.96 
2. The Lawless Zone 
In practice, the truly contested areas fall somewhere between the obvious 
warzone and the peacetime zone. The United States is unlikely to begin 
launching drone strikes in Paris. It is, however, reportedly doing so with 
increasing frequency in places like Yemen and possibly Somalia97—areas 
that can be loosely characterized as “lawless zones.” 
In some ways, a lawless zone shares attributes with a zone of active hos-
tilities. Domestic law enforcement tends to be largely ineffective or non-
existent, suggesting the need for alternative mechanisms to deal with 
threats. In many instances (and certainly in much of Yemen as well as 
Somalia), civilians are on notice that they are living in a conflict zone, even 
if the main conflict is distinct from the transnational conflict between the 
state and a non–state entity (e.g., the internal armed conflict between the 
government and insurgent forces in southern Yemen, and the internal 
armed conflict between al Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Govern-
ment in Somalia).  
Despite these similarities, the lawless zone where a discrete number of 
non–state actors find sanctuary is analytically distinct from the hot conflict 
zone where there is overt, active, ongoing fighting between troops on the 
ground. This is so for two main reasons. 
First, the existence of a separate, distinct conflict of the type often found 
in a lawless zone does not provide notice of a conflict between a belligerent 
state and transnational non–state enemy. In concrete terms, the existence of 
a conflict between al Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government 
does not provide notice of a conflict between the United States and al 
Qaeda affiliates reportedly operating in Somalia. This matters for reasons of 
attribution and accountability. It also affects the degree, if not the fact, of 
conflict experienced by the civilian population. Imagine if the existence of a 
lawless zone gave states free rein to unilaterally attack any alleged non–state 
enemy found therein. Absent any meaningful limits, such a region might be 
 
96 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information 
Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 437, 493-
94 (2012) (arguing for a “clear and convincing” standard to be applied to the identification of non–
state enemy belligerents outside the zone of active hostilities). 
97  See, e.g., Bill Roggio, British Shabab Operative Killed in Airstrike in Somalia, LONG WAR J. 
(Jan 21. 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/british_shabaab_oper.php (asserting 
that the last confirmed U.S. airstrike in Somalia was in June 2011).  
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decimated by external attacks. The situation would likely exacerbate the 
separate conflict, prolong the situation of lawlessness, and make it exceed-
ingly difficult for the population properly to identify or take steps to 
address the source of conflict.98 
Second, operations in a lawless zone are likely to be limited to targeted 
and surgical strikes, often with advance planning and little risk to the state’s 
own troops. This is a very different setting than an active battlefield where 
troops on the ground are exposed to high levels of risk. As is often noted, 
those engaged in on-the-ground combat should not be required to hold their 
fire until they conduct a careful evaluation of the threat posed; such a rule 
would be potentially suicidal. In Yemen and Somalia, by contrast, the 
United States carefully pinpoints and identifies targets, with little to no 
danger to its own troops. When engaging in that type of deliberate killing, 
with negligible risk to one’s own forces, there should be a corresponding 
obligation to take extra precautions to prevent error, overzealousness, and 
abuse.99 
B. Current State Practice 
Since 2006, the United States has, at least implicitly and as a matter of 
policy, distinguished between zones of active hostilities and elsewhere.100 
The Bush Administration initially placed a significant number of off-the-
battlefield captures into long-term law-of-war detention. Detainees reportedly 
included persons captured in places as far-flung from the Afghanistan 
battlefield as Bosnia, Mauritania, and Thailand—as well as the United 
States. 101  These off-the-battlefield detentions turned out to be highly 
controversial. They have been the subject of numerous court challenges, 
 
98 This problem of notice arguably dissipates with each additional strike. But when strikes 
are unacknowledged, unattributed, and launched from afar, as is often the case in the current 
conflict, there is hardly widespread, overt notice of the type that exists when troops are deployed 
on the ground.  
99 Relatedly, identification problems are likely to be acute in a lawless zone, where there is 
usually little in the way of law enforcement and human intelligence capacity. Given that the 
objective of most operations is likely to kill rather than capture, the costs of misidentification are 
irreversible. 
100 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.  
101 See, e.g., Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing the habeas claim 
of a detainee seized in Mauritania); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(describing the habeas claim of an Algerian captured in Bosnia); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 
84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing the claims of, among others, a Yemeni citizen captured in 
Thailand). 
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international criticism, and endless commentary.102 Moreover, they raise 
difficult questions about repatriation—issues with which the United States 
continues to struggle.103  
Beginning in September 2006, the Bush Administration initiated a shift 
in policy. Largely in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,104 President Bush announced that he was closing CIA-run black 
sites, at least temporarily, and ordered the transfer of fourteen long-term CIA 
detainees to Guantanamo.105 Subsequently, the number of out-of-battlefield 
captures transferred to Guantanamo fell to a mere three captures in 2007106 
and only one capture in 2008.107 All were described as high-value targets 
based on alleged links to al Qaeda leadership or involvement in specific 
terrorist attacks.108  
 
102 For examples of judicial challenges, see generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). For an example of international opprobrium, see 
ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SITUATION OF 
DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006).  
103 See, e.g., Bellinger & Padmanabhan, supra note 82, at 209, 233-41 (describing some of the 
hard repatriation questions, such as concerns that a detainee may face mistreatment in his country 
of origin). Difficult transfer and repatriation questions can also arise when foreign nationals are 
captured and held within a zone of active hostilities. 
104 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
105 See George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 2 PUB. PAPERS, 1612, 1617-19 
(Sept. 6, 2006) (stating that the Supreme Court’s decision that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions applied to the conflict with al Qaeda “has put in question the future of the CIA 
program” and that “[t]he current transfers mean that there are now no terrorists in the CIA 
program”). 
106 The three detainees transferred to Guantanamo in 2007 were (1) Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, 
described as being captured as he was “trying to return to his native country,” Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-Value Detainee, No. 494-07 (Apr. 
27, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10792; (2) Adbul 
Malik, reportedly captured in Kenya, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Terror Suspect Trans-
ferred to Guantanamo, No. 343-07 (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/ 
release.aspx?releaseid=10662; and (3) Abdullahi Sudi Arale, reportedly captured in the Horn of 
Africa, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo, No. 703-07 
(June 6, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10976.  
107 Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani, reported to have been captured in Lahore, Pakistan, was 
transferred to Guantanamo in 2008. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Department 
Takes Custody of a High-Value Detainee, No. 206-08 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http:// 
www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11758 (announcing Rahim al-Afghani’s capture 
and removal to Guantanamo Bay); Bill Roggio, U.S. Captures Senior al Qaeda Leader Mohammad 
Rahim, LONG WAR J. (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/03/us_ 
captures_senior_a.php (noting same). 
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-Value Detainee, 
No. 494-07, supra note 106 (describing al-Iraqi as “one of al-Qaida’s highest-ranking and experi-
enced senior operatives”); Press Release, Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo, No. 343-07, 
supra note 106 (“Malik has admitted to participation in the 2002 Paradise Hotel attack in 
Mombasa, Kenya” and in an attempted attack on an Israeli commercial airline). It is, of course, 
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On January 22, 2009, two days after taking office, President Obama 
declared the permanent shuttering of CIA black sites as well as his plan to 
close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. 109  While Guantanamo 
remains open today, the Obama Administration has committed not to 
transfer any additional detainees there.110 Since 2009, Warsame is the only 
known case of an out-of-battlefield detainee being placed in anything other 
than very short-term military custody.111  
Some have argued that the low number of out-of-battlefield detentions 
is due in part to the lack of viable locations for holding detainees. But while 
that may be a factor, it seems that the difficulty of apprehension, the high 
diplomatic, reputational, and transactional costs of such detentions, and the 
relative effectiveness of the criminal justice system in responding to threats, 
are equal—if not more—important factors in limiting the reliance on law-
of-war detention.112 
As out-of-battlefield detentions have declined, targeted killings report-
edly have increased dramatically.113 The vast majority of these killings appear 
 
plausible that the CIA detention sites subsequently reopened after their temporary closure in 
September 2006, or that out-of-battlefield captures were simply moved to long-term detention 
elsewhere, such as Afghanistan. Yet, with the one possible exception of Muhammad Rahim al-
Afghani, who reportedly was held in CIA custody before being transferred to Guantanamo in 
March 2008, the available evidence does not support these scenarios. See Roggio, supra note 107 
(quoting a Pentagon spokesperson as reporting that Rahim al-Afghani was held in CIA custody 
for an eight-month period). As for Afghanistan, estimates indicate that “close to 50” detainees 
captured elsewhere had been brought to the Bagram Theater Internment Facility for long-term 
detention as of 2009. Peter Finn & Julie Tate, Some Held at U.S.-Run Prison in Afghanistan Could 
Return Home, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2012, at A11. The four detainees whose cases are publicly 
known and officially confirmed were brought to Afghanistan well before 2006. Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209-10 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
109 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
110 See Dafna Linzer, Obama Counterterrorism Adviser Slams Congressional Efforts to Block Guantana-
mo’s Closure, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/obama-counterterrorism-
adviser-slams-efforts-to-block-guantanamos-closure (citing a statement by John O. Brennan that even 
if bin Laden were captured, he would not be taken to Guantanamo). 
111 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
112 Indeed, since 2003, hundreds of terrorist suspects in the United States and elsewhere have 
been apprehended by and processed through the civilian criminal justice system with no need to 
invoke the law of war. See, e.g., David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 14-18, nn.47-52 (2011) (listing recent cases involving terrorism 
charges in federal courts). For a general overview of the prosecution of individuals alleged to be 
terrorists by the Department of Justice, see N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON LAW & SECURITY, 
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 (2011), available at 
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf. 
113 Some have suggested that persons who would otherwise be detained are killed instead. 
See, e.g., Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret “Kill List” Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1 (describing the suspicion that “Mr. Obama has avoided the 
complications of detention by deciding, in effect, to take no prisoners alive”). This argument is not 
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to have been concentrated in northwest Pakistan—an area that most 
concede is a spillover of the zone of active hostilities in Afghanistan.114 A 
growing number of strikes reportedly have been launched in Yemen as 
well.115 
The Obama Administration also appears to have adopted a distinction 
between Afghanistan and elsewhere in setting the rules for these strikes. 
While top administration officials have argued that their military authorities 
are not restricted to the “hot” battlefield of Afghanistan, they also have 
argued that “outside of Afghanistan and Iraq” targets are focused on those 
“who are a threat to the United States, whose removal would cause a 
significant—even if only temporary—disruption of the plans and capabilities 
of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”116 Whether or not one agrees with the 
standard employed, it is clear that the administration itself recognizes a 
distinction between Afghanistan (and, earlier, Iraq) and other areas 
embroiled in the conflict with al Qaeda. Procedural rules in terms of who 
must authorize the strike also reportedly vary depending on whether one is 
operating within Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan or else-
where.117 While there are good reasons to demand additional safeguards, the 
 
particularly convincing, given that almost all targeted killings have reportedly occurred in places 
such as northwest Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, where capture operations are extremely difficult, 
if not impossible. It also contradicts the official statement of U.S. policy:  
[W]henever it is possible to capture a suspected terrorist, it is the unqualified 
preference of the Administration to take custody of that individual so we can obtain 
information that is vital to the safety and security of the American people. This is 
how our soldiers and counterterrorism professionals have been trained. It is reflected 
in our rules of engagement. And it is the clear and unambiguous policy of this 
Administration. 
Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9. But see supra text accompanying notes 62-63. 
114 See, e.g., Greg Miller, Under Obama, a Drone Network, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2011, at A1 
(describing several hundred strikes in northwest Pakistan between January 2009 and the end of 
2011); Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013, 
LONG WAR J. (last updated Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php 
(“The US ramped up the number of strikes in July 2008, and has continued to regularly hit at 
Taliban and Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan.”).  
115 See, e.g., Bill Roggio & Bob Barry, Charting the Data for U.S. Air Strikes in Yemen, 2002–
2013, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php 
(last updated Jan. 3, 2012) (documenting a significant increase in strikes within Yemen in 2012). 
116 Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9; see also Holder, supra note 14 (arguing 
that the legal authority to take action against al Qaeda and associated forces is “not limited to the 
battlefields in Afghanistan” but suggesting that targeting operations elsewhere are focused on 
“specific senior operational leaders”). 
117 See Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 
Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539, 575 (2012) (describing a tiered approval process 
for actions against al Qaeda abroad that depends on the location of the action); Becker & Shane, 
supra note 113 (describing President Obama as personally “sign[ing] off on every strike in Yemen 
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United States’ own actions already reflect the importance and value of 
distinguishing between zones of active hostilities and other areas. 
III. THE SPECIFICS: DEFINING THE ZONES AND 
SETTING THE STANDARDS 
Given the basis for distinguishing between zones of active hostilities and 
elsewhere, this Part provides the specifics of the proposed approach. It first 
lays out criteria for distinguishing between a zone of active hostilities and 
elsewhere by drawing on both existing law and the normative justifications 
for the distinctions. It then describes the proposed substantive and proce-
dural standards that ought to apply, consistent with the goals of protecting 
individual liberty, peacetime institutions, and the fundamental security 
interests of the state.  
This task is both necessary and inherently difficult. It is an attempt to 
develop a set of clear standards, or on–off triggers, for a situation in which 
the gravity, imminence, and likelihood of a threat are dynamic, uncertain, 
and difficult to categorize. My aim is to propose an initial set of standards 
that will regulate the use of force and detention without charge outside a 
zone of active hostilities, consistent with the state’s legitimate security 
needs. The expectation is that debate and discussion will help develop and 
refine the details over time.  
A. The Zone of Active Hostilities 
Commentary, political discourse, court rulings, and academic literature 
are rife with references to the distinction between the so-called “hot battle-
field” and elsewhere. Yet despite the salience of this distinction, there is no 
commonly understood definition of a “hot battlefield,” let alone a common 
term applied by all.118 In what follows, I briefly survey the relevant treaty 
 
and Somalia and also on the more complex and risky strikes in Pakistan”); Karen deYoung, 
Brennan Reshaped Anti-Terror Strategy, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2012, at A1 (describing efforts by 
then–Obama advisor John Brennan to standardize targeted killings and collect “legal authorities 
the administration thinks sanction its actions in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond”); Greg 
Miller, U.S. Set to Keep Kill Lists for Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2012, at A1 (describing the 
creation of a “disposition matrix” to eliminate terrorists and the processes surrounding that 
approach). Statements by top Administration officials confirm that the United States applies more 
rigorous procedural reviews to strikes that take place outside Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. 
See, e.g., Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (emphasizing “the rigorous standards and 
process of review to which we hold ourselves today when considering and authorizing strikes 
against a specific member of al-Qaida outside the ‘hot’ battlefield of Afghanistan” (emphasis added)). 
118 See Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: 
Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 36-38 (2010) 
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and case law and offer a working definition of what I call the “zone of active 
hostilities.” This definition takes into account such sources of law as well as 
the normative and practical reasons for this distinction. 
1. Treaty and Case Law 
While not explicitly articulated, the notion of a distinct zone of active 
hostilities where fighting is underway is implicit in treaty law. The Geneva 
Conventions, for example, specify that prisoners of war and internees must 
be moved away from the “combat zone” in order to keep them out of 
danger,119 and that belligerent parties must conduct searches for the dead 
and wounded left on the “battlefield.”120 While there are no explicit defini-
tions provided, the context suggests that these terms refer to those areas 
where fighting is currently taking place or very likely to occur. The related 
term “zones of military operations,” which is spelled out in a bit more detail 
in the Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions, is described as covering 
those areas where there is actual or planned troop movement, even if no 
active fighting.121 
 
(highlighting the difficulty of identifying the “zone of combat” and suggesting several factors that 
should be considered). 
119 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 5(2)(c), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (“Places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the 
combat zone.”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (referring to the process for the “transfer of 
internees” housed near a “combat zone”); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 19, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of war shall be 
evacuated . . . to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out 
of danger.”). 
120 See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 15, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (“Whenever 
circumstances permit, an armistice or a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or local arrangements 
made, to permit the removal, exchange and transport of the wounded left on the battlefield.”); 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the 
Field art. 3, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S. 303 (mandating that a victorious army search 
the “field of battle . . . for the wounded and dead”). 
121 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra 
note 119, 6 U.S.T. at 3532, 75 U.N.T.S. at 302; see OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF 
THE RED CROSS, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR: COMMENTARY 163 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. 
Dumbleton trans., 1958) (“The expression ‘zones of military operations’ . . . may also apply 
to . . . areas, for example, where there are troop movements but not fighting, and even in those 
where there is no actual movement of troops but in which the High Command wishes to be able 
to move them at short notice.”); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PROTOCOL 
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE 
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I): 
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In a variety of contexts, U.S. courts also have opined on whether certain 
activities fall within or outside of a zone of active hostilities, indicating that 
the existence and quantity of fighting forces are key. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
for example, the Supreme Court observed that the large number of troops 
on the ground in Afghanistan supported the finding that the United States 
was involved in “[a]ctive combat” there.122 A panel of the D.C. Circuit 
subsequently noted that the ongoing military campaign by U.S. forces, the 
attacks against U.S. forces by the Taliban and al Qaeda, the casualties U.S. 
personnel incurred, and the presence of other non-U.S. troops under 
NATO command supported its finding that Afghanistan was “a theater of 
active military combat.”123 Previous cases have similarly used the presence 
of fighting forces, the actual engagement of opposing forces, and casualty 
counts to identify a theater of active conflict.124 
Conversely, U.S. courts have often assumed that areas in which there is 
no active fighting between armed entities fall outside of the zone of active 
hostilities. Thus, the Al-Marri and Padilla litigations were premised on the 
notion that the two men were outside of the zone of active hostilities when 
 
COMMENTARY 617 (1977) (noting that “[a] mixed group of the Diplomatic Conference” defined 
“zone of military operations” as “the territory where the armed forces of the adverse Parties taking 
a direct or an indirect part in current military operations, are located”). 
122 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Boumediene v. Bush, 
the Supreme Court again described Afghanistan as part of the “battlefield,” but it failed to explain 
whether all or only part of Afghanistan was included therein, whether the battlefield extended 
beyond Afghanistan, or even what criteria defined the battlefield. 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008). 
123 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also In re Iraq & Afghani-
stan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007) (including both Afghanistan and 
Iraq as part of the “battlefield”). 
124 In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957) (plurality opinion), for example, the Supreme 
Court described the condition of actual hostilities as justifying the finding that one was “in the 
field” for purposes of military commission jurisdiction. Similarly, in Ex parte Milligan, the Court 
emphasized the fact that there had been no “invasion” by enemy armed forces in declaring Indiana 
outside the “theatre of active military operations.” 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). See also Madsen 
v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 357, 362 (1952) (asserting that the “military occupancy” of a territory 
justified the exercise of military commission jurisdiction). The Ninth Circuit identified attacks by 
U.S. naval ships on Iranian gunboats and oil platforms as creating a “combat zone” during the 
Iran–Iraq tanker war. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1335-37 (9th Cir. 1992). Other courts 
have looked to the presence and engagement of fighting forces, as well as to the number of 
casualties, when defining the existence of “war” in the first place—a condition precedent to 
identifying a zone of active hostilities. See, e.g., Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445, 450-51 
(C.C.D. Kan. 1905) (noting that the “occupation of Chinese territory” by U.S. military forces and 
conflicts between U.S. and Chinese troops were key factors in defining engagement in China 
during the Boxer Uprising as “war”); United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3, 5 (C.M.R. 1953) 
(declaring the existence of a state of war in Korea due to the presence of troops, casualties, and the 
“sacrifices required,” among other factors). 
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taken into custody in the United States.125 The central issue in those cases 
was how much this distinction mattered.126 The D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh 
similarly distinguished Afghanistan—defined as part of “the theater of 
active military combat”—from Guantanamo—described as outside of this 
“theater of war”—presumably because of the absence of active fighting 
there.127 In the context of the Guantanamo habeas litigation, D.C. District 
Court judges have at various times also described Saudi Arabia, Gambia, 
Zambia, Bosnia, Pakistan, and Thailand as outside an active battle zone.128  
In defining what constitutes a conflict in the first place, international 
courts have similarly looked at the existence, duration, and intensity of the 
actual fighting. Specifically, in Tadic, the ICTY defined a noninternational 
armed conflict as involving “protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups.”129 In subsequent cases, the ICTY 
 
125 See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Motz, J., concurring) 
(per curiam) (describing Al-Marri’s December 2001 arrest in Peoria, Illinois), vacated, Al-Marri v. 
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(detailing Padilla’s arrest in Chicago after traveling from Pakistan). 
126 In previous conflicts, courts have similarly described the United States as “outside of the 
area of active hostilities” when fighting was concentrated in specific locations overseas. See, e.g., 
United States v. Anderson, 38 C.M.R. 582, 586 (C.M.A. 1967) (defining the United States as 
“outside of the area of active hostilities” during the Vietnam War, yet applying criminal liability 
to an act of desertion that originated in the United States); United States v. Ayers, 15 C.M.R. 220, 
221 (C.M.A. 1954) (suggesting implicitly that the United States fell outside of the area of active 
hostilities during the Korean War). But see Blank, supra note 118, at 23-24 (citing cases in which 
courts held that the continental United States was part of the “field of military operation[s]” 
during World Wars I and II (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
127 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97. 
128 See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446-47 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(describing detainees taken into custody in Gambia, Zambia, Bosnia, and Thailand, even though 
some of them “may never have been close to an actual battlefield”), vacated sub nom. Boumediene 
v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 
311, 316, 320 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that petitioners captured in Bosnia and Pakistan “were not 
captured on or near the battlefields of Afghanistan” and thus were acting “outside of the theatre or 
zone of active military operations” (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated, Boumediene v. 
Bush, 476 F.3d 981, rev’d, 553 U.S. 723; Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(“Abu Ali was not captured on a battlefield or in a zone of hostilities—rather, he was arrested in a 
[Saudi] university classroom while taking an exam.”). For an opposing view on the relevance of a 
detainee’s location to whether he was “in the field,” see Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 
1149 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring), rev’d, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
129 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. Both the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have adopted this test for 
determining the existence of a noninternational armed conflict as well. For the standard used by 
the ICC, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 50, at art. 8(2)(f). For 
the standard used by the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 
619-20 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
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described the term “protracted armed violence” as turning on the intensity 
of the violence and encompassing considerations such as “the number, 
duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons 
and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of weapons 
fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; 
the number of casualties; [and] the extent of material destruction.” 130 
Security Council attention is also deemed relevant.131  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has similarly 
defined noninternational armed conflicts as “protracted armed confrontations” 
that involve a “minimum level of intensity.”132 
2. Identifying the Zone 
Consistent with treaty and case law, overt and sustained fighting are key 
factors in identifying a zone of active hostilities. Specifically, the fighting 
must be of sufficient duration and intensity to create the exigent circum-
stances that justify application of extraordinary war authorities, to put 
civilians on notice, and to justify permissive evidentiary presumptions 
regarding the identification of the enemy.133 The presence of troops on the 
 
130 Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). For a sample of additional cases that have applied the Tadic 
standard to determine the existence of an armed conflict, see Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-
11-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 41-43, 343-47 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 233-37 (Jan. 29, 2007), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF; Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-
T, Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, ¶¶ 14-40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslalvia June 16, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.pdf; 
and Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 182-187 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf.  
131 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala & Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ¶ 90 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/ 
tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf (describing “whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the 
United Nations Security Council” as a relevant factor in identifying the existence of an armed 
conflict); Delali, No. IT-96-21-T at ¶ 190 (citing the attention of the Security Council to the 
conflict in Bosnia as evidence that fighting there “was clearly intense”); see also Laurie R. Blank & 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 
46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2013) (providing an excellent discussion of the ways 
in which this test has ossified in a manner inconsistent with international humanitarian law). 
132 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 5 (March 2008) (emphasis omitted), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. As in the Tadic 
opinion, the ICRC also includes as a second factor the requirement that the parties involved 
“show a minimum [level] of organisation.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 
133 Treaty and case law also provide relevant guidance for determining the factors to which 
one should look in analyzing duration and intensity. See Blank, supra note 118, at 33-34 (compiling 
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ground is a significant factor, although neither necessary nor sufficient to 
constitute a zone of active hostilities. Action by the Security Council or 
regional security bodies such as NATO, as well as the belligerent parties’ 
express recognition of the existence of a hot conflict zone, are also relevant. 
Linking the zone of active hostilities primarily to the duration and 
intensity of the fighting and to states’ own proclamations suffers, however, 
from an inherent circularity. A state can itself create a zone of active 
hostilities by ratcheting up violence or issuing a declaration of intent, 
thereby making previously unlawful actions lawful.134  
It is impossible to fully address this concern. The problem can, however, 
be significantly reduced by insisting on strict compliance with the law-of-
war principles of distinction and proportionality and by vigorously punishing 
states for acts of aggression.135 There will, of course, be disagreement as to 
whether a state’s escalation of a certain conflict constitutes aggression, 
particularly given underlying disagreements about who qualifies as a lawful 
target. The zone approach is helpful in this regard as well: it narrows the 
range of disagreement by demanding heightened substantive standards as to 
who qualifies as a legitimate target outside the zones of active hostilities. 
Under the zone approach, the escalation of force must be aimed at a narrower 
set of possible military targets until the increased use of force is sufficiently 
intense and pervasive enough to create a new zone of active hostilities.  
3. Geographic Scope of the Zone 
A secondary question relates to the geographic scope of the zone of 
active hostilities. In answering the related question of the scope of the 
overarching armed conflict, the Tadic court defined the conflict as extending 
throughout the state in which hostilities were conducted (in the case of 
international armed conflict)136 and the area over which a party had territorial 
control (in the case of a noninternational armed conflict that did not extend 
 
criteria drawn from international criminal cases for evaluating the intensity of hostilities in the 
context of a transnational conflict with a non–state terrorist actor). 
134 This problem also is inherent in the Tadic definition of armed conflict, which makes 
intensity of the violence a determinative factor in identifying the existence of armed conflict. 
135 See the discussion of the principles of distinction and proportionality, supra notes 48-50, 
and accompanying text. 
136 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 68 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (concluding that in international armed conflict 
“the very nature of the Conventions—particularly Conventions III and IV—dictates their 
application throughout the territories of the parties to the conflict; any other construction would 
substantially defeat their purpose”). 
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throughout an entire state).137 Neither approach, however, maps well onto 
the practical realities of a transnational conflict between a state and a non–
state actor. In many cases, the non–state actor and related hostilities will be 
concentrated in a small pocket of the state. It would be contrary to the 
justifications of exigency and proper notice to define the zone of active 
hostilities as extending to the entire state. A territorial control test also does 
not make sense when dealing with a non–state actor, such as al Qaeda, 
which does not exercise formal control over any territory and is driven more 
by ideology than territorial ambition. 
This Article suggests a more nuanced, albeit still imperfect, approach: If 
the fighting is sufficiently widespread throughout the state, then the zone of 
active hostilities extends to the state’s borders. If, however, hostilities are 
concentrated only in certain regions within a state, then the zone will be 
geographically limited to those administrative areas or provinces in which 
there is actual fighting, a significant possibility of fighting, or preparation 
for fighting. This test is fact-intensive and will depend on both the condi-
tions on the ground and preexisting state and administrative boundaries.  
It remains somewhat arbitrary, of course, to link the zone of hostilities 
to nation-state boundaries or administrative regions within a state when 
neither the state itself nor the region is a party to the conflict and when the 
non–state party lacks explicit ties to the state or region at issue. This 
proposed framework inevitably will incorporate some areas into the zone of 
active hostilities in which the key triggering factors—sustained, overt 
hostilities—are not present. But such boundaries, even if overinclusive or 
artificial, provide the most accurate means available of identifying the zone 
of active hostilities, at least over the short term. 
Over the long term, it would be preferable for the belligerent state to 
declare particular areas to be within the zone of active hostilities, either 
through an official pronouncement by the state party to the conflict or via a 
resolution by the Security Council or a regional security body. A public 
declaration would provide explicit notice as to the existence and parameters 
of the zone of active hostilities, thereby reducing uncertainty as to which 
legal rules apply. Such declarations would allow for public debate and diplo-
matic pressure in the event of disagreement. Furthermore, the belligerent 
states could then define the zone with greater nuance, which would better 
 
137 See id. ¶ 70 (“[I]nternational humanitarian law continues to apply[,] . . . in the case of 
internal conflicts, [to] the whole territory under the control of a party . . . .”). 
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reflect the actual fighting than would preexisting state or administrative 
boundaries.138  
Some likely will object that such an official designation would recreate 
the same safe havens that this proposal seeks to avoid. But a critical differ-
ence exists between a territorially restricted framework that effectively 
prohibits reliance on law-of-war tools outside of specific zones of active 
hostilities and a zone approach that merely imposes heightened procedural 
and substantive standards on the use of such tools. Under the zone 
approach, the non–state enemy is not free from attack or capture; rather, 
the belligerent state simply must take greater care to ensure that the target 
meets the enhanced criteria described in Section III.B.  
B. Setting the Standards 
Law-of-war detention and lethal targeting outside a zone of active hos-
tilities should be limited, not categorically prohibited. It should be focused 
on those threats that are clearly tied to the zone of active hostilities and 
other significant and ongoing threats that cannot be adequately addressed 
through other means. Moreover, a heightened quantum of information and 
other procedural requirements should apply, given the possibility and 
current practice of ex ante deliberation and review. Pursuant to these 
guiding principles, this Section proposes the adoption of an individualized 
threat requirement, a least-harmful-means test, and meaningful procedural 
safeguards for lethal targeting and law-of-war detention that take place 
outside zones of active hostilities.  
 
138 Militaries, moreover, regularly make such designations. In the United States, for example, 
the “theater of war” is “[d]efined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the geographic 
combatant commander” as “the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly 
involved in the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat.” JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, JOINT PUBL’N 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS 370 (2011), available at http://ra.defense.gov/documents/rtm/jp1_02.pdf. 
The “theater of operations” is the “operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander 
for the conduct or support of specific military operations.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the 
“area of operations” is “defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces.” Id. at 
25. Another interesting approach would be to tie the geographic boundaries of the zone to the 
rules of engagement that apply therein. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying 
the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 
TEMP. L. REV. 787, 818-27 (2008) (arguing that the use of status-based rules of engagement 
should trigger the application of the laws of war, including the attendant “regulatory obligations” 
derived therefrom).  
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1. An Individualized Threat Finding 
The law of international armed conflict permits the detention and killing 
of members of the enemy force based on a legitimate expectation that 
individuals who are part of a formal, hierarchical enemy state army will be 
called upon to fight and thereby pose an ongoing threat. By comparison, the 
broad definition of “functional membership” put forth by the Executive and 
endorsed by the courts serves as a poor proxy for assessing threat in a 
conflict with a non–state actor.139 Even assuming, arguendo, that the 
functional membership test provides an appropriate standard for detention 
and targeting within a zone of active hostilities, it is too permissive a 
standard outside such zones, for the reasons described in Part II. Outside of 
a zone of active hostilities, an individualized threat finding is needed to 
ensure that law-of-war detention and lethal targeting are employed in those 
situations in which the target actually poses an ongoing threat, consistent 
with the underlying rationale for the permissive use of force and detention 
without charge.140 
Of course, there are a number of possible ways to define the threat. For 
lethal targeting, I suggest two such categories: (1) those involved in the active 
planning or operationalization of specific, imminent, and externally focused 
attacks, regardless of their relative hierarchical position in the organization; 
and (2) operational leaders who present a significant, ongoing, and externally 
focused threat, even if they are not implicated in the planning of a specific, 
imminent attack.141 The first definition is a conduct-based test that prohibits 
 
139 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.  
140 An individualized threat finding also consistent with the ICRC’s position that only those 
who assume a continuous combat function in the armed forces of a non–state party to the conflict 
or take a direct part in hostilities can be targeted in a conflict with a non–state actor. See e.g., Al 
Aulaqi Complaint, supra note 8, at 3. Adoption of such a standard promotes convergence between 
competing views of the rules that ought to apply. See Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to 
Targeting and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1385-91 (2012) (arguing for a functional approach 
to the targeting and detention of non–state actors that allows for convergence of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law based on a common set of principles that 
“focuses decisionmakers on the right questions and suggests comparative answers”). An individu-
alized threat finding is also consistent with the ICRC’s views and those of others who reject the 
notion of a membership test for non–state actors and instead argue that only those who “take a 
direct part in hostilities” can be targeted in a conflict with a non–state actor, subject to meaningful 
periodic reviews. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law, supra note 10, 
at 43.  
141 In its recently released White Paper, the Department of Justice offers a definition of 
“imminent” threat that includes an operational leader who is “personally and continually involved 
in planning terrorist attacks against the United States,” even if the United States “does not have 
clear evidence that an attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate 
future.” DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 7-8. Here, by contrast, I use “imminent” to refer to 
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the use of lethal force absent a specific, imminent, and significant threat. 
The second definition encompasses those who pose a continuous and 
significant threat given their leadership roles within an organization.142 
Whether an individual meets this threat requirement depends on the 
individual’s role within the organization, his capacity to operationalize an 
attack, and the degree to which the threat is externally focused. For example, 
an al Shabaab operational leader, whose attacks are focused on the internal 
conflict between al Shabaab and Somalia’s Transnational Federal Govern-
ment, would not qualify as a legitimate target in the separate conflict 
between the United States and al Qaeda, even if he had demonstrated 
associations with al Qaeda. He might, however, be a legitimate target if he 
were involved in the planning of externally focused attacks and had demon-
strated the capacity and will to operationalize the attacks.143  
Such restrictions serve the important purpose of limiting state authority 
to target and kill to instances in which the individual poses an active, 
ongoing, and significant threat. The low-level foot soldier who is found 
thousands of miles from the hot conflict zone could not be targeted unless 
involved in the planning or preparation of a specific, imminent attack. Even 
mid-level operatives, such as the prototypical terrorist recruiter, would be 
off-limits, unless they were plotting, or recruiting for, a specific, imminent 
attack. 144  Such recruiters could, however, be prosecuted for providing 
material support to a terrorist organization.145  
 
temporal imminence. However, I also adopt a standard (option 2 above) that, in the context of an 
armed conflict, would permit the targeting of an individual who falls within DOJ’s broader 
targeting criteria, if the individual poses a significant, ongoing, and externally focused threat and 
capture is not feasible. 
142 This categorization is similar to the definition of “imminent threat” offered in the DOJ 
White Paper. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 7-8. It is also analogous to the ICRC’s 
distinction between persons who maintain a “continuous combat function” (CCF) in an organiza-
tion and those who only sporadically engage with the organization. See MELZER, supra note 65, at 
995. That concept, and the specific contours of who fits into the CCF framework, however, have 
been the subject of significant controversy—a debate that is beyond the scope of this Article.  
143 A secondary and critical question relates to the standard of proof on which decisionmakers 
rely to make an individualized threat finding. As Geoffrey Corn argues, the amount of infor-
mation required for target identification should be greater for potential threats outside of a zone of 
active hostilities than for those within the zone. Corn, supra note 96, at 457-58. He specifically 
suggests a “clear and convincing” standard for lethal targeting in places like Yemen, Somalia, and 
Pakistan—a standard I support. Id. at 491-93. 
144 Cf. NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE 
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 1022 (2008) (discussing recruiting as an example of “indirect” participa-
tion, unless recruitment is for a specific, planned attack).  
145 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (making it a crime to “knowingly provide[] 
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”); see also Kris, supra note 112, at 14 
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An individualized threat requirement also prohibits so-called “signature 
strikes,” in which anonymous groups of alleged al Qaeda members are 
targeted based on their pattern of activities without an individualized 
assessment of the threat posed by each of the targets.146 
For detention, I suggest the same standards that apply to lethal targeting, 
as well as a third category of fighters whose actions are clearly linked to the 
zone of active hostilities. Under this standard, a low-level al Qaeda or 
Taliban foot soldier who is fleeing from or believed to be traveling in and 
out of the active conflict zone in Afghanistan could be subject to law-of-war 
detention.147 However, once circumstances change, and the active conflict 
zone becomes a latent conflict zone, then this justification for law-of-war 
detention disappears. 148  Unless the detainee presents either a specific, 
imminent, and significant threat or the kind of ongoing, significant threat 
high-level leaders pose that would justify his continued detention, he would 
need to be either transferred to a third party government, released, or 
prosecuted—just as occurred with the detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq and 
is expected to eventually occur with respect to detainees in United States’ 
custody in Afghanistan.149  
Those favoring such an additional category of detention may wonder 
why it should not also apply to targeting operations. Some are likely to 
argue that the low-level foot soldier should not be given a “free pass” if he 
travels to a region where capture is exceedingly risky and the other viable 
means of preventing his return to the fight is a targeted, lethal strike. It is 
worth noting, however, that the United States does not publicly defend the 
lethal targeting of the lone low-level fighter outside the hot conflict zone. 
 
n.47 (listing cases of defendants convicted of terrorism-related offenses, several of whom were 
convicted of providing material support).  
146 If, however, the Taliban and al Qaeda established a cross-border base camp to train and 
organize fighters and to coordinate further actions in the hot conflict zone, the region likely would 
qualify as an extension of the zone of active hostilities. This description arguably fits activity in 
parts of northwest Pakistan.  
147 He would not, however, be a legitimate subject of targeted killing unless he were deemed 
to pose a specific, imminent, externally-focused, and significant threat. 
148 Such a change in circumstances would include, for example, the United States’ withdrawal 
from Afghanistan. 
149 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives 
from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA. J. IN’TL L. 549, 595 (2011) (highlighting that by 2007, the 
United States regularly transferred detainees to Iraqi custody); Carol E. Lee & Adam Entous, 
Obama to Speed Troop Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2013, at A1 (discussing ongoing negotiations 
regarding the transfer of U.S.-held detainees to Afghan custody); Robert M. Chesney, Daqduq 
Transferred to Iraq, LAWFARE (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/daqduq-
transferred-to-iraq (marking the transfer of “the very last detainee held by the U.S. military in 
Iraq”). 
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Its defense of lethal targeting is instead focused on high-level leaders and 
others who pose a “significant threat.”150 Moreover, the United States’ 
public defense of current practices does not include any historical examples—
and I know of none—in which a state has tracked down and killed a low-
level soldier far from the battlefield, even in a state-to-state conflict where 
combatants are relatively easy to identify and are clearly legitimate military 
targets. Rather, the main precedent upon which the United States relies to 
justify its lethal-targeting operations is the killing of Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto, the commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s combined fleet 
in World War II, who was shot down over the Pacific while en route to 
several forward-operating bases.151 
Good reasons exist for this distinction between low-level foot soldiers 
and high-level operational leaders: the deliberate, lethal targeting of an 
individual or group of people is an extraordinary power that should be 
employed only when the security of the state so demands. The state should 
not be permitted to kill absent a strong basis for believing that the individual 
poses an active, ongoing, and significant threat. In a zone of active hostili-
ties, particularly when troops are on the ground and exposed to risk, the 
low-level foot soldier arguably poses such a threat. Outside that zone, lethal 
force is not justified simply on the basis that an individual once attended a 
training camp and may have fought alongside al Qaeda members in Afghani-
stan, unless there is an additional basis for believing that he poses a specific 
and imminent, or ongoing and significant, threat.  
Determining the proper approach for dealing with nonparadigmatic cases, 
however, will require additional work. There may be, for example, circum-
stances in which it will be appropriate for troops or other operatives to take 
custody of persons found with an identified target, even if it is not known 
whether they meet the requisite threat criteria. In these cases, a short-term 
period of detention should be permitted to determine whether the individuals 
meet the criteria for continued detention or if they can be charged with a 
crime and prosecuted.152 As in all cases, the government should immediately 
notify the ICRC about any detainee in its custody and provide the ICRC 
prompt access to the detainee. An additional exception might be warranted 
if the non–state actor established some sort of headquarters or operational 
 
150 See Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (“For example, when considering 
lethal force we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. interests.”). 
151 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 17 (asserting that the killing of the architect of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor was a lawful operation because he was a “leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict” 
and a “belligerent[]”). 
152 Such short-term detention would also allow the state to gather potentially valuable intel-
ligence regarding operational plans. 
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center far removed from the zone of active hostilities. In that case, the 
headquarters might be a legitimate military target, even if it would be 
infeasible to conduct an individualized assessment of each individual 
residing there. Finally, a grave-threat exception may be warranted to 
address a situation in which it is known that a specific, catastrophic attack 
will be launched from an identifiable location, even if the specific persons 
involved could not be individually described and identified.  
2. Least-Harmful-Means Test: Targeted Killings 
Some experts have suggested that a “least-harmful-means” or “least-
restrictive-means” test should and does apply to all targeting killings 
associated with an armed conflict, whether or not they occur in a zone of 
active hostilities. Professor Ryan Goodman, in particular, has amassed 
strong support for this claim, although he also significantly limits the 
application of the rule to situations in which it does not pose any risk to the 
attacking force. 153  Other experts have criticized this claim, on, among 
others, the grounds that it would “inject potentially deadly hesitation into 
the targeting process.”154 Assuming, arguendo, that the military need not 
weigh the possibility of capture when deciding whether to execute a strike 
in the zone of active hostilities, it appears to be an appropriate limiting 
criterion outside of such zones for two primary reasons. 
 
153 See Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with author); see also MELZER supra note 18, at 289 (“[W]here the 
targeting of an individual is concerned, the restrictive aspect of military necessity as informed (and 
not: balanced) by humanitarian considerations requires that, whenever possible, even combatants 
be captured rather than killed.”); Ryan Goodman, The Lesser Evil, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2013) available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/the_obama_administration_a
nd_drones_the_rule_of_law_is_capture_not_kill.html (asserting that the least-restrictive-means test 
“does not require U.S. troops to endanger themselves to try to capture al-Qaida terrorists”).  
154 Robert Chesney, Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen Respond to Goodman on Capture-Instead-of-Kill, 
LAWFARE (Feb. 25, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/corn-blank-jenks-and-
jensen-respond-to-goodman-on-capture-instead-of-kill (posting a critique of Goodman’s argument in 
favor of a limited duty to capture); see also Jens David Ohlin, The Kill–Capture Debate: Lost 
Legislative History or Revisionist History? (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper Mar. 8, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230486 (critiquing Goodman’s 
argument that the law of war provides a duty of capture). But see Robert Chesney, The Capture-vs-
Kill Debate #6: Rejoinder to Goodman from Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen, LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2013, 
3:36 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/the-capture-vs-kill-debate-6-rejoinder-to-goodman-
from-corn-blank-jenks-and-jensen (critiquing Goodman’s position as “overstat[ing] the impact of 
his research by asserting the existence of a clear and obvious binding legal norm”). For additional 
commentary on this issue, see Robert Chesney, The Capture-or-Kill Debate #10: Goodman Responds 
to Heller, LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2013, 1:13 PM), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/ 
03/the-capture-or-kill-debate-10-goodman-responds-to-heller (compiling articles and postings on 
the duty to capture). 
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In such circumstances, there is often the time, and the need for advance 
planning and careful evaluation of possible plans of action for dealing with a 
specific target.155 An evaluation of potential capture operations and the likely 
collateral damage and risk to the U.S. or partner forces if they were to 
engage in such operations should and could be incorporated into this 
advance planning. 
Moreover, there are strong normative and practical reasons to minimize 
lethal targeting outside of zones of active hostilities, including the intrinsic 
value of life; the risk of both targeting error and collateral damage; and the 
costs to the rule of law of allowing the state to kill based on status determina-
tions; and the ways in which such killings can cause resentment among the 
local population and ultimately undercut security gains. Several experts, 
including the former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, and the 
former Commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, General Stanley 
McChrystal, have warned of the blowback that excessive reliance on 
targeted killings can cause.156 When it is feasible both to avoid loss of life 
and to eliminate the threat (and thereby obtain the desired military 
advantage), the state should do so. This is also consistent with the prevailing 
human rights–based norm that the state should not shoot to kill except in 
extreme circumstances, such as where actions are taken in self-defense or 
 
155 See, e.g., Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2011, at 34 (fea-
turing John Rizzo, the CIA’s former acting general counsel, describing the creation of a “hit list”); 
Gregory McNeal, Kill-Lists and Accountability (Mar. 5, 2013) (manuscript at 17-29), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583 (detailing the planning process 
conducted by the United States prior to engaging in a targeted killing).  
156 See Dennis Blair, Op-Ed, Drones Alone Are Not the Answer, N.Y. TIMES, August 15, 2011, 
at A21. (describing the United States’ “reliance on high-tech strikes that pose no risk to our 
soldiers [as being] bitterly resented in a country that cannot duplicate such feats of warfare 
without cost to its own troops”); David Alexander, Retired General Cautions Against Overuse of 
Hated Drones, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-
usa-afghanistan-mcchrystal-idUSBRE90608O20130107 (quoting Retired General Stanley 
McChrystal as warning of the “resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes”); see also 
MICAH ZENKO, REFORMING U.S. DRONE POLICIES, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: 
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 65, at 10-11 (2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/ 
reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736?co=C009601 (describing the strong correlation in 
Yemen between increased targeted killings since December 2009, heightened anger toward the 
United States, and sympathy with or allegiance to AQAP). General James E. Cartwright, the 
former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has similarly warned of the “blowback” resulting 
from targeted killings that threatens to undermine long-term counterterrorism policies. See Mark 
Mazzetti & Scott Shane, As New Drone Policy is Weighed, Few Practical Effects Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2013, at A11 (describing and quoting General Cartwright’s remarks). 
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defense of others, based on an imminent threat, and in the absence of other 
means of addressing the threat.157  
This approach also appears to be consistent with U.S. practice, at least 
as it has been officially described. In the words of John Brennan, it is the 
“unqualified preference of the Administration to take custody” of suspected 
terrorists “whenever it is possible.”158 This approach similarly maps onto 
what the Supreme Court of Israel—a court long accustomed to operating 
amidst state–nonstate actor hostility—has required. In Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, that court ruled:  
[A] civilian should not be attacked at a time that he is taking a direct part in 
hostilities if it is possible to act against him by means of a less harmful 
measure. . . . Therefore, if it is possible to arrest, interrogate and prosecute 
a terrorist who is taking a direct part in hostilities, these steps should be 
followed.159  
The strength of such a test will, of course, ultimately depend on how 
much risk the state is expected to incur in order to pursue a capture operation, 
and how the state evaluates and weighs the relative risks and likelihood of 
success.160 In some situations, a capture operation may actually yield more 
collateral damage than a targeted-killing operation. Additional questions 
relate to the temporal frame in which one makes the assessment and the role 
of the host government. What if the individual could be captured, but with 
a time delay that could be avoided by employing lethal targeting? What if a 
capture operation is deemed infeasible at a given point in time, but might 
become feasible if the target moved to another location? What if the host 
state will consent to a targeted-killing operation but does not cooperate in a 
capture operation or consent to boots on the ground? 
 
157 See Kretzmer, supra note 80, at 202-04 (relying on a hybrid of international human rights 
standards and principles underlying the right of self-defense to argue similarly for a least-harmful-
means test). 
158 Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9; see also Brennan, Wilson Center 
Remarks, supra note 13 (reiterating the “unqualified preference . . . to only undertake lethal force 
when we believe that capturing the individual is not feasible”). 
159 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 62(1) PD 507, 572 [2006] (Isr.), 
translated in 2 Isr. L. Rep. 459, 503 [2006]. The Israeli Supreme Court requires an individualized 
assessment of each target. See id. at 571 (emphasizing the importance of “[p]roperly verified” 
information regarding the “identity and activity” of the target). But see Ohlin, supra note 9, at 23-
25 (critiquing the Israeli Supreme Court’s conflation of human rights and humanitarian law 
principles). 
160 In this regard, it seems as if Goodman’s formulation of the least-restrictive-means test as 
requiring no risk to the attacking party will have minimal effect, particularly when the choice is 
between an unmanned drone and troops on the ground. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  
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The answers to these questions necessarily involve case-by-case analyses. 
Relevant factors to consider include the seriousness of the threat posed; 
the likelihood that the individual who poses the potential threat could 
operationalize his plans; the threat’s imminence; the previous success rate 
of capture operations in a particular region; known information about the 
target’s likely behavior, including the likelihood of other opportunities to 
target or capture if this attempt fails; and risks to those involved in the 
capture operation.  
A few clear-cut rules should apply. First, while the state need not assume 
extreme risk, there must be some acceptance of risk. Second, there should 
be a rebuttable presumption in favor of capture any time it is more likely 
than not that such an operation will be feasible. Third, a relatively short 
time delay should not render a capture operation infeasible unless a credible 
belief exists that the individual will attack during that period of delay. 
Fourth, a host government’s lack of consent to a capture operation should 
not be deemed conclusive absent meaningful efforts to secure consent or 
cooperation.  
3. Least-Harmful-Means Test: Detention 
A least-harmful-means test should also inform long-term detention 
operations. Thus, even in cases where law-of-war detention is permitted (in 
that the individual meets the substantive standard for detention), long-term 
law-of-war detention should be limited to instances in which prosecution is 
infeasible. Efforts should be made to gather admissible evidence in order to 
develop a prosecutable case against the individual. In fact, the United States 
took this approach in the Warsame case, albeit as a matter of policy. Initially 
held in law-of-war detention, Warsame was, after approximately sixty days, 
moved to federal court for civilian trial.161 Such a requirement protects 
against states selectively bypassing functioning domestic criminal justice 
institutions that can effectively address the threat. Such an approach also 
helps to legitimize the state’s detention practices and delegitimize the 
enemy.162 
Simply put, the farther from the hot battlefield, the more likely alternative 
law enforcement means of addressing the threat are available and effective. 
Where such means are available—as they are in Montreal, London, and, of 
course, the United States—there should be an explicit requirement that 
 
161 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Philip Mudd, The Right Way to Punish Al Qaeda, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2011, at 
A17 (arguing that it is in the United States’ security interests to treat al Qaeda fighters as 
murderers and charge them in civilian court). 
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they be employed. Where they are not available (as in Yemen or Somalia), 
additional tools may be justified, but only based on an actual showing of 
need. 
4. Procedural Requirements 
Currently, officials in the executive branch carry out all such ex ante 
review of out-of-battlefield targeting and detention decisions, reportedly 
with the involvement of the President, but without any binding and 
publicly articulated standards governing the exercise of these authorities.163 
All ex post review of targeting is also done internally within the executive 
branch. There is no public accounting, or even acknowledgment, of most 
strikes, their success and error rates, or the extent of any collateral damage. 
Whereas the Department of Defense provides solatia or condolence pay-
ments to Afghan civilians who are killed or injured as a result of military 
actions in Afghanistan (and formerly did so in Iraq), there is no equivalent 
effort in areas outside the active conflict zone.164  
Meanwhile, the degree of ex post review of detention decisions depends 
on the location of detention as opposed to the location of capture. Thus, 
 
163 In a recent set of speeches, Obama Administration officials described some of the policy-
based constraints on the exercise of their targeting authorities, but these are nonbinding limits. 
The recently leaked DOJ White Paper also purportedly describes circumstances in which a U.S. 
citizen could be targeted overseas. But the White Paper describes only one circumstance in which 
such killings are permissible, without setting any outer limits on that authority. DOJ WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 17. And at the same time that officials have articulated discretionary policy 
limits, they have also argued for an underlying and broad-based authority to target anyone deemed 
to be “part of” the enemy force. See, e.g., Brennan, Wilson Center Speech, supra note 12 (arguing 
that the Administration has the legal authority to target the “literally thousands of individuals who 
are part of al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces,” but noting that, in many cases, to do so 
would be unwise); see also DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE 117-43 (2012) (describing the 
difficulties the Obama Administration faced in developing a coherent legal justification for 
detention and targeting policies); Becker & Shane, supra note 113 (discussing the internal 
deliberations and the President’s highly personal involvement in determining targets outside 
zones of active hostilities). The lack of any clearly articulated standards was a source of obvious 
concern at the February 2013 Senate Intelligence Committee confirmation hearing on John Brennan’s 
nomination to be Director of the CIA. See, e.g., Nomination of John O. Brennan to be the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency 55 (Feb. 7, 2013) (question of Sen. Ron Wyden to Mr. Brennan 
during hearing before S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong.), available at http://intelligence. 
senate.gov/130207/transcript.pdf (emphasizing the need for increased transparency and a “public 
conversation” about drones).  
164  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-699, MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S USE OF SOLATIA AND CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN 
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 1-2 (2007) (asserting that the Department of Defense gave out about 
$1.9 million in solatia payments and more than $29 million in condolence payments to Iraqi and 
Afghan civilians between 2003 and 2006 and noting that these were not admissions of liability or 
fault, but rather were intended as expressions of sympathy or remorse).  
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Guantanamo detainees are entitled to habeas review, but detainees held in 
Afghanistan are not, even if they were captured far away and brought to 
Afghanistan to be detained.165 
Enhanced ex ante and ex post procedural protections for both detention 
and targeting, coupled with transparency as to the standards and processes 
employed, serve several important functions: they can minimize error and 
abuse by creating time for advance reflection, correct erroneous depriva-
tions of liberty, create endogenous incentives to avoid mistake or abuse, and 
increase the legitimacy of state action.  
a. Ex Ante Procedures 
Three key considerations should guide the development of ex ante pro-
cedures. First, any procedural requirements must reasonably respond to the 
need for secrecy in certain operations. Secrecy concerns cannot, for example, 
justify the lack of transparency as to the substantive targeting standards 
being employed. There is, however, a legitimate need for the state to 
protect its sources and methods and to maintain an element of surprise in 
an attack or capture operation. Second, contrary to oft-repeated rhetoric 
about the ticking time bomb, few, if any, capture or kill operations outside a 
zone of active conflict occur in situations of true exigency.166 Rather, there 
is often the time and need for advance planning. In fact, advance planning 
is often necessary to minimize damage to one’s own troops and nearby 
civilians.167 Third, the procedures and standards employed must be trans-
parent and sufficiently credible to achieve the desired legitimacy gains. 
These considerations suggest the value of an independent, formalized, 
ex ante review system. Possible models include the Foreign Intelligence 
 
165 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This distinction has been justified 
based on the alleged security concerns associated with bringing civilian lawyers to a base in 
Afghanistan. Cf. id. at 97-98 (stating that Afghanistan is still subject to “the vagaries of war” while 
the United States is “answerable to no other sovereign” in Guantanamo). Such a rationale is not 
convincing, particularly after the military has since invited members of nongovernmental 
organizations to observe the administrative review proceedings that take place there. 
166 For excellent critiques of the excessive and unfounded claims of exigency justifying dep-
rivation of certain liberties, see Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs 
in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 307-12 (2009) and David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, 
and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1440-45 (2005).  
167 See Robert Chesney, Professor, Univ. of Tex. Law Sch., Drones and the War on Terror: 
When Can the United States Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas? 6-7 (Feb. 27, 2013) 
(written statement to the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.), available at http://judiciary. 
house.gov/hearings/113th/02272013_2/Chesney%2002272013.pdf (highlighting the distinction between 
Stage One decisionmaking—during which officials engage in an extensive and often prolonged 
review of whether an individual is a legitimate target—and Stage Two decisionmaking—which 
involves target identification and operational decisionmaking). 
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Surveillance Court (FISC),168 or a FISC-like entity composed of military 
and intelligence officials and military lawyers, in the mode of an executive 
branch review board.169  
Created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978,170 
the FISC grants ex parte orders for electronic surveillance and physical 
searches, among other actions, based on a finding that a “significant pur-
pose” of the surveillance is to collect “foreign intelligence information.”171 
The Attorney General can grant emergency authorizations without court 
approval, subject to a requirement that he notify the court of the emergency 
authorization and seek subsequent judicial authorization within seven 
days.172 The FISC also approves procedures related to the use and dissemi-
nation of collected information. By statute, heightened restrictions apply to 
the use and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons. 173 
Notably, the process has been extraordinarily successful in protecting 
extremely sensitive sources and methods. To date, there has never been an 
unauthorized disclosure of an application to or order from the FISC court. 
An ex parte review system for targeting and detention outside zones of 
active hostility could operate in a similar way. Judges or the review board 
would approve selected targets and general procedures and standards, while 
still giving operators wide rein to implement the orders according to the 
approved standards. Specifically, the court or review board would deter-
mine whether the targets meet the substantive requirements and would 
 
168 Senators Diane Feinstein (D-CA), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Angus King (I-ME) have 
recently advocated the adoption of a system to review the targeting of U.S. citizens. See Press 
Release of Angus King, U.S. Senator, King Offers Proposal to Review Targeted-Strikes (Feb. 13, 
2012), available at http://www.king.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=339592; Carlos Muñoz, Sens. 
Feinstein, Leahy Push for Court Oversight of Armed Drone Strikes, THE HILL (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/282033-feinstein-leahy-push-for-court-
oversight-of-armed-drone-strikes. Robert Chesney has made a similar suggestion. See Chesney, 
supra note 167, at 2, 7-10 (outlining a proposal for ex ante judicial review of decisions to target U.S. 
citizens).  
169 Individuals would need to be appointed and supervised in a way that protects against 
political, bureaucratic, or command influence. The rules governing the appointment and 
supervision of Inspectors General provide a possible model. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2006). See also 
Neal K. Katyal, Op-Ed, Who Will Mind the Drones?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A27 (arguing for 
a national security court housed in the executive branch to review targeted killing decisions). But 
see Eugene Fidell, Letter to the Editor, A Drone Panel Within the Executive Branch?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 28, 2013, at A28 (criticizing Professor Katyal’s national security court proposal on policy and 
normative grounds).  
170 Pub. L. No. 95-115, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1812 
and scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
171 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).  
172 Id. § 1805(e)(1). 
173 Id. § 1806. 
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evaluate the overarching procedures for making least harmful means–
determinations, but would leave target identification and time-sensitive 
decisionmaking to the operators.174  
Moreover, there should be a mechanism for emergency authorizations at 
the behest of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelli-
gence. Such a mechanism already exists for electronic surveillance conducted 
pursuant to FISA.175 These authorizations would respond to situations in 
which there is reason to believe that the targeted individual poses an 
imminent, specific threat, and in which there is insufficient time to seek and 
obtain approval by a court or review panel—as will likely be the case in 
instances of true imminence justifying the targeting of persons who do not 
meet the standards applicable to operational leaders. As required under 
FISA, the reviewing court or executive branch review board should be 
notified that such an emergency authorization has been issued; it should be 
time-limited; and the operational decisionmakers should have to seek court 
or review board approval (or review, if the strike has already taken place) as 
soon as practicable—but at most within seven days.176  
Finally, and critically, given the stakes in any application—namely, the 
deprivation of life—someone should be appointed to represent the potential 
target’s interests and put together the most compelling case that the indi-
vidual is not who he is assumed to be or does not meet the targeting 
criteria. 
The objections to such a proposal are many. In the context of proposed 
courts to review the targeting of U.S. citizens, for example, some have 
argued that such review would serve merely to institutionalize, legitimize, 
and expand the use of targeted drone strikes.177 But this ignores the reality 
of their continued use and expansion and imagines a world in which targeted 
 
174 This proposal tracks Chesney’s analogous efforts to distinguish Stage One and Stage Two 
decisionmaking, and to protect Stage Two decisionmaking from ex ante judicial interference. See 
supra note 167. It also addresses one of the key concerns identified by former Department of 
Defense Counsel, Jeh Johnson. See Jeh Charles Johnson, A Drone Court: Some Pros and Cons, 
Keynote Address at the Center on National Security at Fordham Law School (Mar. 18, 2013) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Fordham Law School Remarks], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons (warning against judges reviewing 
operational matters). 
175 See supra text accompanying note 172.  
176 Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e)(1)(D) (describing similar requirements for the Attorney General 
to authorize emergency use of electronic surveillance). 
177 See, e.g., Judson Berger, US Senators Propose Assassination Court to Screen Drone Targets, 
FOX NEWS (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/11/us-senators-propose-
assassination-court-to-screen-drone-targets (quoting Professor Jonathan Turley as warning that 
applying a FISC-like review model to decisions to target U.S. citizens would “legitimize” the 
asserted authority “to kill citizens without charge or judicial review”) 
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killings of operational leaders of an enemy organization outside a zone of 
active conflict is categorically prohibited (an approach I reject178). If states 
are going to use this extraordinary power (and they will), there ought to be 
a clear and transparent set of applicable standards and mechanisms in place 
to ensure thorough and careful review of targeted-killing decisions. The 
formalization of review procedures—along with clear, binding standards—will 
help to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking and will ensure consistency across 
administrations and time. 
Some also condemn the ex parte nature of such reviews.179 But again, 
this critique fails to consider the likely alternative: an equally secret process 
in which targeting decisions are made without any formalized or institu-
tionalized review process and no clarity as to the standards being employed. 
Institutionalizing a court or review board will not solve the secrecy issue, 
but it will lead to enhanced scrutiny of decisionmaking, particularly if a 
quasi-adversarial model is adopted, in which an official is obligated to act as 
advocate for the potential target.  
That said, there is a reasonable fear that any such court or review board 
will simply defer. In this vein, FISC’s high approval rate is cited as evidence 
that reviewing courts or review boards will do little more than rubber-stamp 
the Executive’s targeting decisions.180 But the high approval rates only tell 
part of the story. In many cases, the mere requirement of justifying an 
application before a court or other independent review board can serve as an 
internal check, creating endogenous incentives to comply with the statutory 
requirements and limit the breadth of executive action.181 Even if this 
system does little more than increase the attention paid to the stated 
requirements and expand the circle of persons reviewing the factual basis 
for the application, those features in and of themselves can lead to increased 
reflection and restraint.  
 
178 See supra subsection III.B.1.  
179 See, e.g., Gabor Rona, The Pro Rule of Law Argument Against a ‘Drone Court’, THE HILL, 
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/285041-the-pro-rule-of-law-argument-
against-a-drone-court (warning that a “secret judicial process in which the right to life is at stake 
but the owner of that life has no say is an affront both to American values and international legal 
principles”).  
180 See id. (warning of a court serving as “rubber stamp”); see also Katyal, supra note 169 
(citing a 1 in 3000 odds of being rejected by the FISC, based on a record of rejecting just 11 out of 
more than 32,000 requests between 1979 and 2011). 
181 As then–Circuit Judge Anthony Kennedy noted, infrequent denials of applications do not 
necessarily reflect official acquiescence to the whims of the Executive, but instead evince a 
“practice of careful compliance with the statutory requirements on the part of the government”—
or, at the very least, careful preparation of the court filings. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 
787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987).  
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Additional accountability mechanisms, such as civil or criminal sanctions 
in the event of material misrepresentations or omissions, the granting of 
far-reaching authority to the relevant Inspectors General, and meaningful 
ex post review by Article III courts,182 are also needed to help further 
minimize abuse.  
Conversely, some object to the use of courts or court-like review as 
stymying executive power in wartime, and interfering with the President’s 
Article II powers.183 According to this view, it is dangerous—and potentially 
unconstitutional—to require the President’s wartime targeting decisions to 
be subject to additional reviews. These concerns, however, can be dealt with 
through emergency authorization mechanisms, the possibility of a presidential 
override, and design details that protect against ex ante review of operational 
decisionmaking. The adoption of an Article II review board, rather than an 
Article III–FISC model, further addresses some of the constitutional 
concerns.  
Some also have warned that there may be no “case or controversy” for 
an Article III, FISC-like court to review, further suggesting a preference for 
an Article II review board.184 That said, similar concerns have been raised 
with respect to FISA and rejected. 185 Drawing heavily on an analogy to 
courts’ roles in issuing ordinary warrants, the Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel concluded at the time of enactment that a case and contro-
versy existed, even though the FISA applications are made ex parte.186 
 
182 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Drones and the War 
on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas? 8-11 (Feb. 27, 2013) 
(written testimony submitted to the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong.), available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/02272013_2/Vladeck%2002272013.pdf (offering a very thoughtful 
proposal for an Article III ex post damages regime to review targeted killings).  
183 See, e.g., Johnson, Fordham Law School Remarks, supra note 174 (suggesting that a FISC-
like court would interfere with the President’s Commander-in-Chief authorities). This, however, 
appears to be a United States–specific objection. It is, for example, widely accepted in Israel that 
the courts have a role in reviewing targeted-killing operations. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. 
Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 62(1) PD 507, 514 [2006] (Isr.), translated in 2 Isr. L. Rep. 459, 
514-17 [2006] (asserting the court’s authority to review targeted killings and discussing the scope of 
review). 
184 See Johnson, Fordham Law School Remarks, supra note 174; Vladeck, supra note 182, at 5-
6 (describing Article III concerns). 
185 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732 n.19 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (con-
cluding that there is no merit to an earlier objection to the “statutory responsibilities of the FISA 
court” that the court was “inconsistent with Article III case and controversies responsibilities of 
federal judges because of the secret, non-adversary process”).  
186 See Foreign Intelligence Elec. Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and 
H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 
26-31 (1978) (memorandum of John M. Harmon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel) 
(arguing that a “case or controversy” existed on the grounds that the judges would be ruling on a 
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Here, the judges would be issuing a warrant to kill rather than surveil. 
While this is significant, it should not fundamentally alter the legal analysis.187  
As the Supreme Court has ruled, killing is a type of seizure.188 The judges 
would be issuing a warrant for the most extreme type of seizure.189  
It is also important to emphasize that a reviewing court or review board 
would not be “selecting” targets, but determining whether the targets 
chosen by executive branch officials met substantive requirements—much as 
courts do all the time when applying the law to the facts. Press accounts 
indicate that the United States maintains lists of persons subject to capture 
or kill operations—lists created in advance of specific targeting operations 
and reportedly subject to significant internal deliberation, including by the 
President himself.190 A court or review board could be incorporated into the 
existing ex ante decisionmaking process in a manner that would avoid 
interference with the conduct of specific operations—reviewing the target 
lists but leaving the operational details to the operators. As suggested above, 
emergency approval mechanisms could and should be available to deal with 
exceptional cases where ex ante approval is not possible.191 
Additional details will need to be addressed, including the temporal limits 
of the court’s or review board’s authorizations. For some high-level operatives, 
inclusion on a target list would presumably be valid for some set period of 
 
“specific and concrete issue”; the ruling touches the legal relationship of the United States and the 
target of surveillance; it is conclusive; the judge is being asked to apply standards of law to the 
facts; and there is adversity in fact, even if both parties are not present at court). Others have 
emphasized the legal fiction that the subject of the warrant will have the opportunity to attack the 
warrant in a later criminal proceeding.  
187  See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 167, at 9 (noting the “razor-thin legal fiction” that a FISC 
warrant will ultimately be contested in an adversarial hearing). To the extent that this fiction is 
deemed key, it could be dealt with by creating an after-the-fact damages remedy and allowing 
litigants to contest the initial authorization during that process. 
188 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force 
is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
189  That said, this might be a task that judges do not wish to take on—a factor that may 
point to a preference for an Article II review board. See Michael B. Mukasey, Opinion, How to 
Untangle an Incoherent Drone Policy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2013, at A15 (“Judges have no basis or 
background that suits them to review targeting decisions and no way to gather facts independently.”); 
James Robertson, Judges Should Not Decide About Drones Strikes, WASH. POST, (Feb. 15, 2013), 
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-15/opinions/37117878_1_drone-strikes-justice-
department-white-paper-federal-courts (arguing against the preapproval of “kill lists” by federal 
judges). 
190 See Becker & Shane, supra note 113. 
191 The most persuasive argument, it seems to me, against any of these options is a political, 
not a policy, one—namely lack of faith in the political process to design a court or review board 
that is rational and appropriately limited along the lines suggested in this Article. That is a 
significant concern—but does not defeat the value of describing what such a scheme should look 
like, at least in theory. 
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time, subject to specific renewal requirements. Authorizations based on a 
specific, imminent threat, by comparison, would need to be strictly time-
limited, and tailored to the specifics of the threat, consistent with what 
courts regularly do when they issue warrants.  
In the absence of such a system, the President ought to, at a minimum, 
issue an executive order establishing a transparent set of standards and 
procedures for identifying targets of lethal killing and detention operations 
outside a zone of active hostilities.192 To enhance legitimacy, the procedures 
should include target list reviews and disposition plans by the top official in 
each of the agencies with a stake in the outcome—the Secretary of Defense, 
the Director of the CIA, the Secretary of State, the Director of Homeland 
Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, with either the Secretary 
of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, or President himself, respon-
sible for final sign-off.193 In all cases, decisions should be unanimous, or, in 
the absence of consensus, elevated to the President of the United States.194 
Additional details will need to be worked out, including critical questions 
about the standard of proof that applies. Given the stakes, a clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard is warranted.195 
 
192 See also Johnson, Fordham Law School Remarks, supra note 174 (arguing that “the Presi-
dent can and should institutionalize his own process, internal to the Executive Branch, to ensure 
the quality of the decisionmaking”). This option suffers from the obvious problem that it lacks any 
permanency and that the next administration can revoke or amend it with the stroke of a pen. 
That said, in the absence of legislation, it would provide a clear, and at least temporarily binding, 
statement of the standards and procedures that are being applied. While the Obama Administra-
tion has made a nod to increased transparency in a series of speeches by top national security 
officials, these speeches lack any prescriptive force and fail to set any binding limits on future 
actions. See Alston, supra note 54, at 308-18 (providing an excellent discussion of the importance of 
transparency in the standards and procedures used to identify targets).  
193 See Miller, supra note 117 (suggesting that such a process currently exists for targeted 
killings, including vetting by all the key agencies and sign-off by the President himself on targeted 
killings outside Pakistan); see also KLAIDMAN, supra note 163, at 200-23 (describing the vetting 
process). By formalizing and codifying this process in an Executive order, the President can help 
ensure that it will be followed in all cases, protect against deviations, promote transparency as to 
the standards and processes employed, and ensure that a particular individual or set of individuals 
bear final responsibility as the relevant decisionmakers.  
194 Recent reporting suggests that, as of May 2012, President Obama was reviewing all tar-
geting decisions for Yemen and Somalia, as well as roughly a third of the targeting decisions for 
Pakistan. Becker & Shane, supra note 113. For an argument that presidential review is a good 
thing, see David Luban, What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones, and Just War Theory, 
BOSTON REV. (June 6, 2012), http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.3/david_luban_obama_drones_ 
just_war_theory.php.  
195 See Corn, supra note 96, at 493-94 (arguing that a clear and convincing standard creates a 
demanding burden while preserving the ability to take action when necessary). 
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While this proposal is obviously geared toward the United States, the 
same principles should apply for all states engaged in targeting operations.196 
States would ideally subject such determinations to independent review or, 
alternatively, clearly articulate the standards and procedures for their 
decisionmaking, thus enhancing accountability. 
b. Ex Post Review 
For targeted-killing operations, ex post reviews serve only limited purposes. 
They obviously cannot restore the target’s life. But retrospective review 
either by a FISC-like court or review board can serve to identify errors or 
overreaching and thereby help avoid future mistakes. This can, and ideally 
would, be supplemented by the adoption of an additional Article III 
damages mechanism.197 At a minimum, the relevant Inspectors General 
should engage in regular—and extensive—reviews of targeted-killing 
operations. Such post hoc analysis helps to set standards and controls that 
then get incorporated into ex ante decisionmaking. In fact, post hoc review 
can often serve as a more meaningful—and often more searching—inquiry 
into the legitimacy of targeting decisions. Even the mere knowledge that an 
ex post review will occur can help to protect against rash ex ante decision-
making, thereby providing a self-correcting mechanism.  
Ex post review should also be accompanied by the establishment of a 
solatia and condolence payment system for activities that occur outside the 
active zone of hostilities. Extension of such a system beyond Afghanistan 
and Iraq would help mitigate resentment caused by civilian deaths or 
injuries and would promote better accounting of the civilian costs of 
targeting operations.198 
As for detention operations, detainees captured outside a zone of active 
hostilities should, at a minimum, be entitled to judicial habeas review, 
regardless of where they are detained. There should be a searching inquiry 
into the basis for detention, conducted, of course, in a way that protects 
 
196 For a recent example of another powerful state considering the use of targeting killing, 
see Jane Perlez, Chinese Plan to Kill Drug Lord with Drone Highlights Military Advances, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013, at A5. 
197 See Vladeck, supra note 182; see also Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process 
and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO. L. REV. 405, 440-45 (2009) (arguing for the 
availability of a post hoc Bivens-style action in which “a survivor of an attempted targeted killing 
or an appropriate next friend . . . claims that the attack was unconstitutional because it violated 
the Fifth Amendment on a ‘shock the conscience’ theory or because it constituted excessive force 
under the Fourth Amendment”).  
198 This proposal would obviously require that such killings be made public, even if initially 
conducted as a clandestine or covert operation. 
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sources and methods.199 Use of hearsay should be permitted, consistent with 
the basic requirement that the detainee be provided sufficient information 
about the source of relevant information to be able to respond effectively.200 
The detaining state should also provide additional periodic reviews to 
protect against the continued detention of individuals who no longer pose a 
threat—a procedure that the Obama Administration has announced, but not 
yet instituted, with respect to the Guantanamo detainees.201 As suggested 
by Professors Matthew Waxman and Monica Hakimi, these review procedures 
should be amended to apply “increasingly stringent evidentiary standards” 
over time.202 Such a requirement recognizes that the security benefits of 
detention often diminish over time (particularly if based on an individual’s 
involvement with a specific, lapsed—or foiled—plot), while the costs to 
 
199 See, e.g., A. & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 96 (2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499d4a1b2.html (ruling that an individual subjected to a 
“control order” must be provided with sufficiently detailed allegations to allow him to instruct his 
attorney on a meaningful response (citing Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. MB(FC), [2007] 
UKHL 46, [65]-[67], [85], [90] (appeal taken from Eng.))). A similar standard should govern 
here. 
200 Cf. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (warning 
that the “presumption of regularity” given to the government’s intelligence reports “‘comes 
perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says must be treated as true’” and “‘it 
is hard to see what is left of the Supreme Court’s command in Boumediene that habeas review be 
‘meaningful’” (citations omitted)); Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit after Boumediene, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1466-67, 1489 (2011) (noting the ways in which the D.C. Circuit’s 
rulings have substituted “some” review for what ought to be a “meaningful” review of the legal and 
factual basis for detention). 
201 Pursuant to a 2011 Executive order, continued “detention is warranted for a detainee . . . if 
it is necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.” Exec. 
Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. 227, 227 (2011). Detainees are entitled to full executive branch reviews 
every three years, at which point they are represented by a government-appointed “personal 
representative” and permitted to submit “relevant information” and call “reasonably available” 
witnesses. Id. at 13, 228-29. File reviews are conducted every six months in the intervening years. 
Id. at 229. Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, the final decision to 
release or transfer a Guantanamo Bay detainee is vested with the Secretary of Defense. National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1023, 125 Stat. 1298, 1564-65 
(2011) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801). As of January 2013, however, such reviews had not yet 
commenced. 
202 Hakimi, supra note 82, at 413; see also Waxman, supra note 55, at 1412 (proposing an “esca-
lating standard of certainty” for subsequent reviews, where a higher burden of proof is required to 
keep someone in detention). But see David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected 
Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 736 n.204 (2009) (suggesting that such an approach 
will affect only the “marginal cases” because initially strong evidence is “unlikely to be weakened 
by the passage of time” and will likely “suffice to justify an extended detention”). The current 
procedures employed by the Obama Administration would need to be amended to incorporate this 
recommendation. 
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personal liberty increase.203 Thus, while the initial review might employ a 
reasonable belief or probable cause standard, subsequent reviews might 
employ a preponderance-of-evidence or clear-and-convincing standard. 
Moreover, at some point, continued detention arguably crosses from 
preventive to punitive; when that point is reached, there should be a 
requirement of either prosecution or release.  
IV. ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION: 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICTS, SELF-DEFENSE, 
 AND INCORPORATION INTO U.S. LAW 
This Part looks ahead, explaining how the framework laid out in this 
Article can and should be implemented not only in the current conflict, but 
also in future conflicts. 
A. Diffuse Conflicts 
This Article has assumed the existence of one or more zones of active 
hostilities, involving either a large-scale military presence or consistent 
aerial attacks. But what happens when no such center of gravity exists? 
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter predicts that future conflicts are unlikely 
to resemble those in Afghanistan and Iraq, which involved the large-scale 
ground invasion of one state by others.204 Rather, they are more likely to 
involve targeted operations conducted by special forces and intelligence 
operatives without any active zone of hostilities.205 In fact, this description 
may fit the situation in Afghanistan once the United States and NATO 
remove their troops.206 
Such a situation raises two distinct questions: First, can there be an 
armed conflict without a zone of active hostilities? Second, if so, what rules 
apply? Answering the first question depends on a fact-intensive analysis of 
 
203 Cf. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. Israel 62(4) PD 329, 396 [2008] (Isr.), translation 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf (“The longer the 
period of the administrative detention, the greater the weight of the prisoner's right to his 
personal liberty when balanced against considerations of public interest, and therefore the greater 
the onus placed upon the competent authority to show that it is necessary to continue holding the 
person concerned in detention.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
204 Anne-Marie Slaughter, War and Law in the 21st Century: Adapting to the Changing Face of 
Conflict, EUROPE’S WORLD, Autumn 2011, at 32.  
205 See id. 
206 See Johnson, Oxford Remarks, supra note 14 (describing a future “tipping point” at which 
the United States will no longer be in an “armed conflict against al Qaeda and its associated forces” 
but rather will focus its counterterrorism efforts against “individuals who are the scattered remnants 
of al Qaeda”).  
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the nature of the conflict, applying the factors laid out in Tadic.207 Is the 
fighting of sufficient intensity and duration to qualify as an armed conflict? 
Is there an organized group that the belligerent state is fighting? This 
Article is based on the premise that once these threshold requirements are 
met, the conflict extends to where the belligerent parties operate, but that 
the rules for targeting and detention vary depending on whether one is 
acting within a zone of active hostilities. Similarly, if a single organization 
engages in sustained and intense attacks against an opposing state, an armed 
conflict may exist, even if the attacks emanate from multiple locations and 
lack a central zone of activity. That said, there would need to be strong and 
convincing evidence to establish that ongoing attacks and threat of attack 
emanated from a single organization and were of sufficient intensity and 
duration to justify the assertion of an armed conflict.208 In such a situation, 
the more restrictive substantive and procedural standards would apply 
throughout the entire conflict.  
B. Self-Defense Killings 
Absent the existence of an armed conflict, the United States—supported 
by a number of scholars—will turn increasingly to a self-defense theory to 
justify actions that would otherwise be conducted under a law-of-war 
framework. The United States has already suggested that certain targeted 
killings that have taken place outside of Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan 
are legitimate under both an armed-conflict and a self-defense justifica-
tion.209 Statements by CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston suggest that 
self-defense is in fact the primary basis for the CIA’s targeted-killing 
operations, with law-of-war authorities acting as a backstop.210 Meanwhile, 
 
207 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.  
208 There is a strong argument that al Qaeda will no longer meet this standard once the United 
States leaves Afghanistan and there ceases to be a zone of active conflict there. See, e.g., Chesney, 
supra note 167, at 10-11 (“The United States is drawing down in Afghanistan, and though it may 
maintain forces there, it is more likely than not that the use of force in Afghanistan beyond 2014 
will resemble current uses of force in Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan—i.e., episodic, low-intensity 
uses of force that will generate dispute as to whether an armed conflict exists and whether the laws 
of war are relevant.”); cf. Johnson, Oxford Remarks, supra note 14 (describing the possible end of 
the conflict, but declining to say if or when that point is near).  
209 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 17 (“[A]s a matter of international law, the United States is in an 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the 
horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). See generally supra note 17  
210 See Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, CIA, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Apr. 10, 
2012), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/ 
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scholars and European allies who reject the idea that the United States is 
engaged in a transnational armed conflict with al Qaeda nonetheless agree 
that the United States may act in self-defense against those al Qaeda 
operatives who pose an imminent threat, regardless of where they are 
located.211 
However, the standards as to which actions are permitted under a claim 
of self-defense are equally—if not more—contested and underdeveloped as 
the standards governing targeting and detention in a transnational armed 
conflict.212 Is anticipatory self-defense permitted? Under what circumstances? 
How do the standards of “necessity” and “proportionality” apply? Even if 
human rights standards are deemed applicable, under what circumstances do 
self-defense killings violate the prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of 
life?213 
Assuming, arguendo, that, consistent with the U.S. view, some uses of 
anticipatory self-defense are permitted, the framework described in Part III 
offers a general approach for beginning to limit and legitimize the scope of 
acceptable self-defense killings as well. Critically, the standards for who 
could be targeted would need to be stringently limited to those who pose an 
actual, significant, and imminent threat that cannot be addressed by other 
means. Such an approach provides the benefits of increased transparency 
and procedural protections—including meaningful ex post reviews—and 
explicitly limits self-defense killing only in situations where capture is 
infeasible.  
 Additional work is needed to flesh out the precise standards for con-
cluding that a threat justifies action in self-defense. But by applying the 
general approach described in Part III both to lethal targeting that takes 
place outside a zone of active hostilities in the course of an armed conflict 
 
cia-general-counsel-harvard.html (commenting that for the authority to act, “we need look no further 
than the inherent right of national self-defense, which is recognized by customary international law”). 
211 See, e.g., Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9 (describing the views of 
key U.S. allies that use of force outside of “‘hot’ battlefields” would be permissible as a matter of 
self-defense only in response to an “imminent” threat); Paust, supra note 77, at 280 (“During a 
lawful self-defense response, targeted killings and the capture of non-state actor fighters and 
others who are directly and actively engaged in non-state actor armed attacks can be permissible 
no matter where such forms of direct participation occur.”). But see O’Connell, supra note 70, at 14 
(examining what constitutes a lawful exercise of self-defense under international law, and 
concluding that “[a]n armed response to a terrorist attack will almost never meet these parame-
ters”). 
212 See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 
(describing “self-defense” as “one of the most contested issues in all of public international law”), 
in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR 346, 366 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).  
213 See generally Kretzmer, supra note 80, at 177-83 (examining the contours of the “right to 
life” under the international human rights regime). 
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and to killings undertaken in self-defense outside an armed conflict, states 
can begin to develop a clear and consistent set of practices to regulate 
targeted killings outside the conflict zone.214 Such an approach furthers the 
important goal of creating and protecting a stable set of expectations as to 
the rules that apply to these killings. The approach serves to limit the state’s 
use of premeditated lethal force to instances in which the targets pose a 
profound and ongoing threat that cannot be dealt with through other 
means. Finally, the framework protects against the perverse situation in 
which self-defense justifications are used as end-runs around the more 
restrictive set of law-of-war rules proposed here.  
C. Implementation and Security Benefit 
One might be skeptical that a nation like the United States would ever 
accept such constraints on the exercise of its authority. There are, however, 
several reasons why doing so would be in the United States’ best interest.  
First, as described in Section II.B, the general framework is largely 
consistent with current U.S. practice since 2006. The United States has, as 
a matter of policy, adopted important limits on its use of out-of-battlefield 
targeting and law-of-war detention—suggesting an implicit recognition of 
the value and benefits of restraint.  
Second, while the proposed substantive and procedural safeguards are 
more stringent than those that are currently being employed, their imple-
mentation will lead to increased restraint and enhanced legitimacy, which in 
turn inure to the state. As the U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual explains, it 
is impossible and self-defeating to attempt to capture or kill every potential 
insurgent: “Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful 
counterinsurgents must thus cut off the sources of that recuperative power” 
by increasing their own legitimacy at the expense of the insurgent’s legiti-
macy.215 The Counterinsurgency Manual further notes, “[E]xcessive use of 
force, unlawful detention . . . and punishment without trial” comprise 
“illegitimate actions” that are ultimately “self-defeating.”216 In this vein, the 
Manual advocates moving “from combat operations to law enforcement as 
 
214 Cf. Hakimi, supra note 140, at 1372, 1387-91 (arguing for a “functional” approach to detaining 
and targeting non–state enemy actors). 
215 U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24: COUNTERINSURGENCY para. 
1-129 (2006). 
216 Id. para. 1-132; see also id. para. 1-128 (“[K]illing every insurgent is normally impossible. 
Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular 
resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.”). 
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quickly as feasible.”217 In other words, the high profile and controversial 
nature of killings outside conflict zones and detention without charge can 
work to the advantage of terrorist groups and to the detriment of the state. 
Self-imposed limits on the use of detention without charge and targeted 
killing can yield legitimacy and security benefits.218 
Third, limiting the exercise of these authorities outside zones of active 
hostilities better accommodates the demands of European allies, upon 
whose support the United States relies. As Brennan has emphasized: “The 
convergence of our legal views with those of our international partners 
matters. The effectiveness of our counterterrorism activities depends on the 
assistance and cooperation of our allies—who, in ways public and private, 
take great risks to aid us in this fight.”219 By placing self-imposed limits on 
its actions outside the “hot” battlefield, the United States will be in a better 
position to participate in the development of an international consensus as 
to the rules that ought to apply. 
Fourth, such self-imposed restrictions are more consistent with the 
United States’ long-standing role as a champion of human rights and the 
rule of law—a role that becomes difficult for the United States to play when 
viewed as supporting broad-based law-of-war authority that gives it wide 
latitude to employ force as a first resort and bypass otherwise applicable 
human rights and domestic law enforcement norms. 
Fifth, and critically, while the United States might be confident that it 
will exercise its authorities responsibly, it cannot assure that other states 
will follow suit. What is to prevent Russia, for example, from asserting that 
 
217 Id. para. 1-131; see also Alexander, supra note 156 (quoting Stanley McChrystal as fearing 
that drone strikes “exacerbate[] a ‘perception of American arrogance’”); Blair, surpa note 156 
(noting that the continued use of drone strikes impedes the goal of destroying al Qaeda and 
advocating that the United States should partner with Pakistan to improve “local government on 
the ground”); Mudd, supra note 162 (warning that the treatment of al Qaeda as “a powerful 
movement meriting a military response” provides as “boon to al-Qaeda, allowing its fighters to argue 
that they remain a strategic threat”). Mudd is the former deputy director of the CIA’s Counter-
terrorism Center and served as senior intelligence adviser to the FBI from 2009 to 2010. Id.  
218 See Brennan, Wilson Center Remarks, supra note 13 (emphasizing that “going after every 
single [member of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces] . . . would neither be wise 
nor . . . effective”). 
219 Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 9; see also John B. Bellinger III, Partner, 
Arnold & Porter LLP, Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged 
Americans Overseas? 9 (Feb. 27, 2013) (testimony before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/02272013_2/Bellinger%2002272013.pdf 
(warning of concerns posed by key allies with respect to U.S. targeted-killing operations); Ravi 
Somaiya, Drone Strike Prompts Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, at A4 
(describing concerns among British intelligence officers that they could face prosecution for 
sharing intelligence with the United States that is used in drone strikes). 
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it is engaged in an armed conflict with Chechen rebels, and can, consistent 
with the law of war, kill or detain any person anywhere in the world which 
it deems to be a “functional member” of that rebel group? Or Turkey from 
doing so with respect to alleged “functional members” of Kurdish rebel 
groups? If such a theory ultimately resulted in the targeted killing or 
detaining without charge of an American citizen, the United States would 
have few principled grounds for objecting. 
Capitalizing on the strategic benefits of restraint, the United States 
should codify into law what is already, in many key respects, national policy. 
As a first step, the President should sign an Executive order requiring that 
out-of-battlefield target and capture operations be based on individualized 
threat assessments and subject to a least-harmful-means test, clearly articu-
lating the standards and procedures that would apply. As a next step, 
Congress should mandate the creation of a review system, as described in 
detail in this Article. In doing so, the United States will set an important 
example, one that can become a building block upon which to develop an 
international consensus as to the rules that apply to detention and targeted 
killings outside the conflict zone. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated 
debate about whether the conflict with al Qaeda is concentrated within 
specific geographic boundaries or extends to wherever al Qaeda members 
and associated forces may go. The United States’ expansive view of the 
conflict, coupled with its broad definition of the enemy, has led to a legiti-
mate concern about the creep of war. Conversely, the European and human 
rights view, which confines the conflict to a limited geographic region, 
ignores the potentially global nature of the threat and unduly constrains the 
state’s ability to respond. Neither the law of international armed conflict 
(governing conflicts between states) nor the law of noninternational armed 
conflict (traditionally understood to govern intrastate conflicts) provides the 
answers that are so desperately needed. 
The zone approach proposed by this Article fills the international law 
gap, effectively mediating the multifaceted liberty and security interests at 
stake. It recognizes the broad sweep of the conflict, but distinguishes 
between zones of active hostilities and other areas in determining which 
rules apply. Specifically, it offers a set of standards that would both limit 
and legitimize the use of out-of-battlefield targeted killings and law of war–
based detentions, subjecting their use to an individualized threat assessment, 
a least-harmful-means test, and significant procedural safeguards. This 
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approach confines the use of out-of-battlefield targeted killings and deten-
tion without charge to extraordinary situations in which the security of the 
state so demands. It thus limits the use of force as a first resort, protects 
against the unnecessary erosion of peacetime norms and institutions, and 
safeguards individual liberty. At the same time, the zone approach ensures 
that the state can effectively respond to grave threats to its security, wherever 
those threats are based. 
The United States has already adopted a number of policies that distin-
guish between zones of active hostilities and elsewhere, implicitly recognizing 
the importance of this distinction. By adopting the proposed framework as a 
matter of law, the United States can begin to set the standards and build an 
international consensus as to the rules that ought to apply, not only to this 
conflict, but to future conflicts. The likely reputational, security, and 
foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor. 
 
